


COMBATING TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA AGAINST  
BOKO HARAM TERRORIST GROUP



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2014-01

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

### COMBATING TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF NIGERIA AGAINST BOKO HARAM TERRORIST GROUP, by Major Chukwuma O. Ani, 135 pages.

Nigeria is currently experiencing unusual security challenges caused by the recent emergence of terrorist acts by an Islamic extremist group in the country. The Islamic extremist group named “Boko Haram” (BH), a Hausa phrase which means “Western Education is forbidden,” became known in 2009 and operates mostly in the northern part of Nigeria. Attacks by the group have resulted in loss of lives, numbering in thousands and properties worth millions of dollars. The group has shaken the economy and threatens the sovereignty of Nigeria in many ways, including a bid to Islamize the country. The Nigerian Government (NG) has committed much effort in combating the BH terrorists, but the group continues to terrorize the country. The counterterrorism operation by NG against the terrorist group involves mostly a direct approach, which focuses on the use of force. Inadequate effort is observed to be given to the indirect approach to counterterrorism, which focuses on Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) and is a complementary approach to any counterterrorism operation that must succeed.

This study identifies the indirect approach as part of a holistic NG’s strategy for achieving successful counterterrorism operation against BH terrorist group. Specifically, the research creates and analyzes an IIA model for counterterrorism operation in Nigeria. The Model tests against the IIA as applied by the United States government in Operation Enduring Freedom for workability. This study concludes that the adoption of the Model as part of the NG counterterrorism effort may assist the government neutralize BH and prevent its re-emergence.

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## ACRONYMS

AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
BH	Boko Haram.
IIA	Inform and Influence Activities.
JTF	Joint Task Force.
LOE	Lines of Effort.
MISO	Military Information Support Operations.
NG	Nigerian Government.
PTO	Proscribed Terrorist Organization.
U.S.	United States.
WMD	Weapon of Mass Distraction.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The quest to satisfy man's selfish desires has often led to the use of violence against his fellow man. One aspect of the multifaceted tenets of violence is terrorism. The word "terror" came into use in international politics during the French Revolution of 1789-1794, a period which has been described as the "Reign of Terror" in French history.<sup>1</sup> The period, also known as the "Age of Enlightenment," was an era of violence incited by conflict between rival political blocs. The French Government used the instrument of state to execute and intimidate political rivals. Since then, terrorism has been on the increase in different parts of the world, including Africa.

#### Background

Nigeria (officially called Federal Republic of Nigeria), the most populous country in Africa, is situated in the West African region (figure 1). Nigeria is bounded to the west, north, north east, east, and south by Benin Republic, Niger Republic, Chad, Cameroun, and Atlantic Ocean respectively. The country, with a population of more than 170 million people and over 350 ethnic groups, and 4000 languages remains a mixture of cultures and interests. The major religions practiced in Nigeria are Christianity and Islam (Christianity—50.8 percent, Islam—47.8 percent, and others—1.4 percent).<sup>2</sup> The first people

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<sup>1</sup>Brian Forest, *Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 44.

<sup>2</sup>Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project, "Regional Distribution of Christians," December 2011, <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/global-christianity-regions/> (accessed December 27, 2013).

to occupy the place, now called Nigeria, were the Nok people (500 BC to 200 AD). Later on, the Kanem Bornu, Oyo, Benin, and Hausa-Fulani people migrated to the land. In 1851, Britain annexed Lagos as her colony and subsequently took over the rest of the region by 1885. The region, after the amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914, was placed under Sir Lord Fredrick Lugard as the Governor General and named Nigeria. Subsequently, Nigeria got her independence from Great Britain on October 01, 1960 and became a Republic in 1963.

Nigeria's founding fathers desired a system of government that would neutralize any political threat and accommodate the diverse nature of the country, hence introduced the federal system of government. Federalism is a system of government in which the same territory is controlled by at least two levels of government.<sup>3</sup> The primary challenge is that the national government governs issues that affect the entire country while smaller subdivisions govern issues of local concern.<sup>4</sup> Both levels of government have authorities to make laws and enjoy a certain level of autonomy. Nigeria's federal system comprises three levels; federal, state and local governments. The success of Nigeria's adoption of this federal system of government has influenced both Nigerian military and civil regimes to retain it.<sup>5</sup> However, despite the autonomous characteristic of federalism, the Nigerian system requires the local government to remain subordinate to the state and federal

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<sup>3</sup>Cornell University Law School, "Federalism," <http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federalism#main-menu> (accessed March 9, 2014).

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>CIA World Fact Book, Country Studies, "Nigeria Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations," March 2005, [http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/government/nigeria\\_government\\_federalism\\_and\\_intra~10025.html](http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/government/nigeria_government_federalism_and_intra~10025.html) (accessed March 9, 2014).

governments and act only as administrative agencies of the two higher levels of government.<sup>6</sup>

The Nigerian central government operates on the idea that the federal government own the country and its resources as a whole. Consequently, this central bureaucracy takes the funds that rightly belong to the state and local governments into the reserves of the Federal Government.<sup>7</sup> As a result, the subdivisions that have almost completely lost their autonomy are denied the ability to carry out their functions for the progress and welfare of their citizens. The federalist system in Nigeria has resulted in the country's poor political, social and economic development. Many have criticised the Nigerian federal system of government of not being able to manage and contain the country's diverse nature.<sup>8</sup> The system has even been criticised for lack of accountability and adherence to the rule of law and alleged to have caused or worsened conflicts and corruption in the country.<sup>9</sup>

The long awaited democratic government in Nigeria, built upon federalism, was truncated however on January 15, 1966 by a military coup that resulted in a series of military regimes and violence. The resultant effect was an unsuccessful secession attempt by the eastern part of the country that declared an Independent Republic of Biafra. This

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Baristter Ukoima, "Nigeria: Concept of Federalism," Barrister Ukoima Blog, <http://ukoima.blogspot.com/p/nigeria-concept-of-federalism.html> (accessed March 9, 2014).

<sup>8</sup>Suberu T. Rotimi, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, March 2003), <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=7324> (accessed March 9, 2014).

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

threw Nigeria into civil war that lasted for three years (1967–1970). Similarly, prior to, during and after the civil war, there has been agitation by the people of the Niger Delta region over oppression, marginalization and environmental degradation of their area.

The Niger Delta region is the source of oil that provides the economic foundation of the government. Agitation by the Niger Delta people has resulted in violence and several armed groups were formed as a result. The most prominent among them is the Movement for the Emancipation of the People of Niger Delta (MEND). The militants in Niger Delta have used several means, including abduction, killing, and diplomacy in pursuing their goals. These actions of the militants have negatively affected the Nigerian economy. To fight the threat posed by the militants to Nigerian economy, security (life and property) and its very existence, many measures have been taken by the Nigerian Government (NG). Among the measures are military actions and introduction of Amnesty for Niger Delta Militants (from 2009). Though militancy in the region still exists, the measures employed by the NG have relatively brought the activities of the armed groups under reasonable control. These measures show that sectorial violence and counter-insurgency strategies are not new to Nigerian system.

Differences in religion (especially Christianity and Islam) have also fueled some crises in Nigeria and affected the economic and political affairs of the country. The history of Christian-Muslim conflict in Nigeria dates back to 1966 when Moslem jihadists slaughtered about 100,000 Christian Igbos and other Easterners in Northern Nigeria.<sup>10</sup> The 1979 dispute over the status of Sharia in the nation's legal system further

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<sup>10</sup>Africa Today, “Divide Nigeria like Sudan-100 Cases of Mass Islamic Killing and Terrorism in Nigeria,” Modern Ghana, January 16, 2011, <http://www.modernghana.com>.

soured the relationship between the two religions and they clash at the slightest provocation.<sup>11</sup> The country has therefore experienced many religious crises which have resulted in loss of lives and properties. The issue of religious rivalry has since then permeated the nation's political landscape. This is evident in the story of Nigerian nationalism which is expressed in the discursive language of federalism.<sup>12</sup> Fear of domination by one region or religion over the other at the federal level is a common practice.<sup>13</sup> Many politicians at one time or another exploit religious differences as a political instrument for their mobilization.<sup>14</sup> Some even capitalize on religious crisis to vent their anger on their opponents, even when neither Bible nor Quran preached violence but peaceful coexistence.

Akin to the violence in the Niger Delta and religious rivalry, there have been several other sectorial, tribal, and communal crises in the country. Some of them have been successfully resolved while some still exist, but under control. Conversely, the recent emergence of terrorist acts in Nigeria has subjected the country into serious

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com/news/312370/1/divid-nigeria-like-sudan-100-cases-of-mass-islamic.html (accessed March 8, 2014).

<sup>11</sup>Opeloye Muhib, *Building bridges of understanding between Islam and Christianity in Nigeria* (Ikeja: Free Enterprise Publishers, 2001), 18.

<sup>12</sup>Jibrin Ibrahim and Toure Kazah-Toure, "Ethno-religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria," The Nordic Africa Institute, December 2003, <http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/archives/042ibrahimkazah/> (accessed March 8, 2014).

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Kehinde Fakanbi and Olarotimi Raji, "A Federation in Disarray: An Interrogation of National Integration and Security Challenges of Nigeria's Fourth Republic," African Education Research Network, December 2003, [http://www.ncsu.edu/aern/TAS13.2/TAS13.2\\_Fakanbi.pdf](http://www.ncsu.edu/aern/TAS13.2/TAS13.2_Fakanbi.pdf) (accessed March 8, 2013).

security challenge. An Islamic group named “Boko Haram” (A Hausa phrase which means “Western Education is forbidden”) operates mostly in the northern part of the country. This group has threatened the sovereignty of the Nigeria in many ways, including a bid to Islamize the country. The NG and its allies have committed much effort in combating the BH Terrorists, but the terrorist group continues to terrorize the country. The purpose of this research is to determine an effective way that the NG can neutralize the Boko Haram (BH) terrorist group.




Figure 1. Map of Nigeria and its location in Africa

Source: Total Facts about Nigeria, "Physical Map of Nigeria," <http://www.total-facts-about-nigeria.com/physical-map-of-nigeria.html> (accessed April 28, 2014).

### Primary Question

How can BH terrorists in Nigeria be neutralized?

### Secondary Questions

1. What is terror and terrorism?
2. Why is terrorism effective?
3. What is the BH Terrorist group?
4. What measures have been used in combating BH terrorist group in Nigeria?
5. What measure(s) could be adopted to successfully neutralize the BH terrorist group in Nigeria?

### Assumptions

This study assumes that Nigeria has committed and continues to commit effort to resolve its security issues. It is also assumed that BH is a home grown terrorist group. The majority of BH members, especially the key leaders are Nigerians and indigenes of the troubled States or at least, their neighboring States. It is assumed that there is little happening in an area without the knowledge of the local leaders. Assumed also is that there are locals who know some of the members of the BH group, but refuse to reveal them due to fear for their lives or deliberate connivance with the group. There must be some BH members who did not voluntarily join, but were forced into the group. There are also some people who may have adopted the group's ideology at the beginning and joined as members, but have changed their mind and wish to quit.

It is assumed that the BH group sometimes holds meetings in some other areas within the metropolis or suburbs of the affected States or neighboring States. For BH

group to be thriving well in some areas in countries neighboring Nigeria means that some people among the locals must be facilitating it. There may be some prominent and wealthy Nigerians who sponsor the BH group, mainly for political, religious and/or selfish reasons.

### Limitations

The clandestine nature of terrorism makes it difficult to get a full or exact understanding of the BH terrorist group. Interviews with terrorists are also not possible. The geographical distance between Nigeria and the present location (United States of America) of the researcher makes it difficult to conduct oral interviews with security stakeholders in Nigeria. Even if the distance were to be short, most countries regard their counterterrorism measures as classified security issue, hence, interviewing the stakeholders would be problematic. Considering the evolving nature of the on-going fight against the BH terrorists in Nigeria, this study will only cover the period from June 11, 2009 to October 1, 2013 in its research. In view of the above, this research is therefore primarily conducted using published books and articles on NG, terrorism, and BH terrorist group.

## Definitions

### Terrorism

Terrorism is the threat of or use of violence by person, group or state against another person, group, or state for political, religious or other selfish reasons or paradigm change.<sup>15</sup>

### Political Terrorism

Political terrorism is the sustained policy involving the waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a movement, or faction, or by a small group of individuals.<sup>16</sup> It is aimed toward the achievement of political objectives and can be carried out by either a government (those in power), the opposition (those aspiring to be in power), a liberation movement or terrorist body.<sup>17</sup>

### Criminal Terrorism

Criminal Terrorism is the systematic use of acts of terror for objective of private material gains.<sup>18</sup> This type of terrorism is normally carried out often by an individual or group of few individuals mainly for selfish gains and not for the interest of any legitimate organization.

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<sup>15</sup>Osisioma Nwolise, “Terrorism: what is to be done about an emerging threat to democracy, good governance, development, and security of nations in the 21st century?,” Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique, December 2005, <http://books.openedition.org/ifra/800?lang=it> (accessed August 17, 2013).

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

### Repressive Terrorism

Repressive Terrorism is defined as the systematic use of acts of violence for the purposes of suppressing, quelling, or restraining certain groups, individuals, or forms of behaviour considered undesirable by the repressor.<sup>19</sup> The repressor may be the State, or a faction while the repression may be directed against the entire population or a selected part of it. State terror, police terror, colonial terror, and military terror fall under repressive terrorism.

### Revolutionary Terrorism

Revolutionary Terrorism is the resort to systematic tactics of violence with the aim of bringing about political revolution.<sup>20</sup> National liberation movements, guerrilla groups, international terror group often carry out revolutionary terrorism. The features of revolutionary terrorism include collective rather than individual action; the existence of a guiding ideology or program, some degree of popular support, etc.

### Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism

Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism is the terrorism used for political motives other than the pursuit of revolutions.<sup>21</sup> Examples are attempts to force a government to introduce a desired policy, law, or programme, revenge on government for repressive acts, or retaliation against invasion of land or cultural interference.

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Terrorism is a broad topic that needs to be understood to set the context for this research. Consequently, this chapter focuses on understanding terrorism. In order to achieve that, it discusses the meaning of terror as well as terrorism and its various types. It also looks at causes of terrorism and the effects it has on society. Furthermore, the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria and its resultant effect are thoroughly examined. The measures so far used by NG and its allies in combating the terrorist group are equally discussed. This conceptual discourse lays a proper foundation for better understanding and appreciation of the subject. This chapter further reviews existing literature in the field of terrorism and BH terrorist group, hence, establishes the theoretical framework of analysis for this project.

#### Terror

Terror is defined as something or somebody that causes a very strong feeling of fear.<sup>22</sup> The term, terror, also signifies a psychic state of great fear or dread.<sup>23</sup> It denotes the action or quality of causing dread, and great fear. The act of terror therefore, can make the victim do certain things he may not have normally done.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Perrault Stephen, *Merriam-Webster's Advanced Learner's English Dictionary* (Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Incorporated, 2008), 1697.

<sup>23</sup>Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism* (London: Macmillan, 1974), 9.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

There are three key types of terror which include psychic, criminal and political terror.<sup>25</sup> An example of psychic terror is when a terrorist places a gun against a person's forehead. Criminal terror is carried out by individuals who want to utilize blackmail or intimidation to enrich themselves. Political terror is the type that carries out activities in order to produce psychic terror that affects the political situation.<sup>26</sup>

It is also argued that terror can be classified as defensive, repressive, enforcement, or agitational terror.<sup>27</sup> Defensive terror is the systematic use of terrorization by groups in a population to defend their traditional rights. Repressive terror is the systematic use of terrorization by a government or by rebels to eliminate rivals, coerce popular support or maintain conformity within the rebel organisation.<sup>28</sup> Enforcement terror relates to repressive terror as the former is the type launched by those in power and agitational terror stands for the terroristic acts launched by people that are seeking for power.<sup>29</sup>

'Terror' could therefore be understood as a concept on its own since it does not necessarily mean terrorism. While acknowledging that without terror, there will be no terrorism, it could be argued that the two have different meanings. Terror may be employed for criminals for personal ends while terrorism could be described to be the use

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<sup>25</sup>Osioma Nwolise, "Terrorism: A Deadly Threat To Democracy, Good Governance, Development, National And International Security In The 21st Century: What Is To Be Done?" (Research Paper, National War College, Abuja, 2004), 6.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

of terror as a weapon of psychological warfare for political ends. Consequently, terrorism needs to be further explained for better understanding.

### Terrorism

Terrorism does not have a precise and universally accepted definition. Acts that convey terrorist impressions are often viewed from different perspectives by different people. Those considered terrorists by one group of people or government may be regarded as heroes or freedom fighters by some other people. The government of a state may label as terrorism, all violent acts committed by their political opponents while anti-government extremists may frequently claim to be the victims of governmental terror. Thus, what constitutes terrorism or a terrorist depends on one's political standpoint. Because of the complex nature of the term and frequently irrational individual responses to it, terrorism is very difficult to accurately define and to study, especially scientifically.

One definition of terrorism states that it is the method or theory whereby an organized group seeks to achieve its vowed aims, chiefly through the use of violence.<sup>30</sup> This conception of terrorism is that it is “the threat or use of violence and terror for the achievement of a political, socio-economic or other expedient purpose against an individual or group of individuals, a thing or group of things, a state or group of states.”<sup>31</sup>

Another definition of terrorism includes the use of or threatened use of force designed to bring about a political change.<sup>32</sup> Terrorism can also be conceptualized as “the

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<sup>30</sup>Nwolise, “Terrorism: What is to be done about an emerging threat.”

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Forest, *Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy*, 4.

premeditated and unlawful use or threatened use of violence against a noncombatant population or target having symbolic significance, with the aim of either inducing political change through intimidation and destabilization or destroying identified as an enemy.”<sup>33</sup>

The United States Department of States also recognizes that “no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance.” However, it chooses the definition of terrorism as contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d); “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”<sup>34</sup> In any of these definitions, it can be observed that they all have ‘threat and violence’ as ways of achieving terrorism. Notwithstanding, in the absence of any universally accepted definition of terrorism, a conception is formed for the purpose of this work and possible future consideration by interested scholars. Hence, this research defines terrorism as the threat of or use of violence by person, group or state against another person, group, or state for political, religious or other selfish reasons or paradigm change.<sup>35</sup>

### Types of Terrorism

Though there are numerous definitions of the term ‘terrorism,’ nearly all have been observed to contain certain ingredients. There are generic dimensions that

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid.,5.

<sup>34</sup>Department of State, “Legislative Requirement and Key Terms,” <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf> (accessed August 18, 2013).

<sup>35</sup>Nwolise, “Terrorism: What is to be done about an emerging threat.”

distinguish some terrorists, terrorist groups and terrorist acts from most others.<sup>36</sup> There are also different types of terrorism based on different variables or factors of classification. They are political, criminal, repressive, state, revolutionary, and sub-revolutionary terrorisms.<sup>37</sup> The definition sub-heading can be referred to for the meaning of the types of terrorism.

### Causes of Terrorism

In order to successfully combat terrorism, it is important to understand the root causes. It is in doing this that policy makers would be able to engage the root cause and seek solutions to quell already existing terrorism. Much as this is worrisome, the causes of terrorism have been under serious debate. While no universally accepted causes of terrorism have been established, it should be noted that it is a combination of several causes that leads to terrorism. Some of the causes are ethno-nationalism, alienation/discrimination, religion, socio-economic status, and political grievances.

#### Ethno-nationalism

The desire of a group of people to break away from a government or ruling power and create a state of their own can cause the formation of terrorist groups. This is the kind of desire that characterized the 20th Century world where many regions try to gain independence from their colonial masters.<sup>38</sup> Current example of ethno-nationalist driven

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<sup>36</sup>Forest, *Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy*, 8.

<sup>37</sup>Nwolise, “Terrorism: A Deadly Threat,” 6-7.

<sup>38</sup>Nick Grothaus, “Causes Of Terrorism,” Hand of Reason, <http://handofreason.com/2011/featured/causes-of-terrorism> (accessed August 18, 2013).

groups is the Chechen terrorist organizations that attack the government and people of Russia in the attempt to form their own state.

### Alienation/Discrimination

Many scholars on terrorism have pointed to a sense of alienation felt by immigrants, particularly those living in Europe, as a driver of terrorism.<sup>39</sup> Many times these groups face discrimination in the countries in which they reside, leading to further feelings of alienation. The new host nation's culture most times are different from those of the immigrants. As a result, they become irritated and begin to feel excluded from the society around them. Growing sentiments of discrimination can lead groups to look to more conservative, and eventually, extremist ideologies.<sup>40</sup> The Hamburg Cell, consisting of two of the pilots in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, serves as a perfect example. The cell included a number of expatriate Muslims studying in Germany who sought out other conservative Muslims to band together when they felt homesick in a Western society that was alien to them.<sup>41</sup>

### Religion

Religion is one of the major causes of terrorism in the current era. Even if it is argued as not being the main cause of terrorism, it is undeniable that religion plays significant roles in driving some forms of it. Religion as cause of terrorism has mainly

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

been attributed to Islamic fundamentalism as they move to reestablish the past Muslim glory in many parts of the world.<sup>42</sup>

#### Socio-Economic Status

Relative socio-economic inferiority may also drive terrorism and globalization plays a vital role in it.<sup>43</sup> Globalization creates an acute awareness about opportunities available elsewhere. This leads to frustration, victimization, and humiliation among growing cohorts of urbanized, undereducated, and unemployed youth who are able to make comparisons across countries. Seeing the economic differences between themselves and the Western world can infuriate some people in underdeveloped countries, thereby increasing tension and hostilities and ultimately resulting to terrorism.

#### Political Grievances

A situation where there are grievances against a certain political order may trigger terrorism from opposing groups. The same applies to a situation where there is lack of political inclusiveness. Similarly, many people in nations with authoritarian regimes lack avenues for dissent.<sup>44</sup> Frustrated expressions of political-will can result to violence as an alternative to exclusive political systems.<sup>45</sup> While relatively similar to ethno-nationalist/separatist causes, this type does not originate from the desire to create a new state but to change the order within the existing one.

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

### Accidental Guerrilla

The Accidental Guerrilla is a newly observed cause of terrorism. It is the situation that prevails in countries with weak government or engulfed by crises.<sup>46</sup> In either case, a terrorist organization moves into the State and uses it as safe haven to spread their ideologies and as a base to carry out violent acts. When outside forces intervene to deal with the threat posed to them by this group, the locals reject the 'foreign invaders' and ally with the terrorist group, thus creating more terrorists and popular support for terrorist movements. The case of the United States intervention in Iraq to counter Al Qaeda is a typical example.

### Effects of Terrorism on the Society

There is no doubt that the effects of terrorism on the society largely depend on source, objectives, and the extent of force applied by a particular terrorist group. This notwithstanding, the consequences of terrorism include, but are not limited to death, physical injury and pain, emotional stress, kidnapping, human rights abuse, destruction of property and infrastructure, fear, mental agony, and economy disruption. These have been the problems suffered by many countries, including Nigeria, that are affected by one terrorist group or the other.

### Counterterrorism Theory

The effect of terrorism on the society led to the search for techniques on how to combat terrorism. Consequently, counterterrorism theory was established as a guide to

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

combatting terrorism.<sup>47</sup> The campaign framework for counterterrorism is composed of three elements: friendly, enemy, and the global environment.<sup>48</sup> The structure of the campaign uses five logical Lines of Effort (LOEs). These LOEs are further divided into two categories consisting of direct and indirect approaches.<sup>49</sup> The direct approach is the effort applied directly against the enemy while the indirect approach is applied indirectly to influence the global or operational environment.<sup>50</sup> The aims of the framework is to create a stabilized environment which is hostile to terrorists and their organizations, and to isolate, neutralize, and prevent the reemergence of the threats posed by terrorism.

### Direct Approach

The direct approach in the counterterrorism framework describes actions taken against terrorists and their organizations. These actions are taken to neutralize an imminent threat and degrade the operational capability of a terrorist organization. The goals of the direct approach are to defeat a specific threat through neutralization or dismantlement of the network and to prevent the reemergence of a threat once neutralized. However, the long term effectiveness of the direct approach if solely applied is limited by the resiliency of terrorist organizations and their ability to reorganize. The LOEs that are specific to direct approach are to: disrupt terrorists and their organizations and to deny them access to and use of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). The first

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<sup>47</sup>Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 3-26, *Counterterrorism* (Washington DC: Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2009), V and XV.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., III-2.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., III-4.

LOE focuses on the terrorists' infrastructure and leadership which provide them connectivity and resources. The second LOE focuses on denying acquisition, development, or the use of WMD against sovereign States.

### Indirect Approach

The indirect approach to counterterrorism theory describes the means within which the operational environments can be influenced to achieve successful counterterrorism operations.<sup>51</sup> The goal of indirect approach is to enable partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations. It also aims at shaping and stabilizing the environment in order to weaken the capabilities and support-lines of terrorist organizations.<sup>52</sup> The indirect approach combines activities like Foreign Internal Defense; Unconventional Warfare; Stability Operations; Civil Military Operations; Counterintelligence; Information Operation; Psychological Operations; and Strategic Communication.

The LOEs that associate with indirect approach are to: enable allies or partners to combat terrorism; to deter implied and active support for terrorism; and to wear down support for terrorist ideologies.<sup>53</sup> The first LOE focuses on ensuring that partners have both the capabilities and will to effectively combat terrorism.<sup>54</sup> The realization of the goal of partners securing their own territory is decisive in a counterterrorism campaign. The

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid., III-5.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., III-5 to III-6.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., III-5.

second LOE focuses on deterring state and non-state actors from providing tacit and active support to terrorist organizations.<sup>55</sup> The third LOE concentrates on eroding legitimacy of terrorist ideologies and neutralizing their propaganda as well as misinformation campaigns which often serve as justification for acts of terrorism.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, it reduces support for terrorists by alleviating the fundamental conditions (e.g., government corruption, poverty, chronic unemployment, and illiteracy), which can be exploited by terrorists.

#### Combining the Direct and Indirect Approaches

The combination of direct and indirect approaches in counterterrorism theory brings the desired end state to counterterrorism operations. The direct approach, which tends toward use of force and aimed at neutralizing and dismantling the terrorist organizations, cannot solely achieve total victory over terrorism. It must be significantly supported with the indirect approach to counterterrorism to achieve desired success. The indirect approach to counterterrorism focuses on Inform and Influence Activities (IIA). It influences the environment by shaping and stabilizing it to deny terrorists safe havens. It also denies the terrorist organizations access to population bases that are ripe for terrorist recruiting operations. The indirect approach further seeks to change the conditions, ideologies, and motivations which encourage terrorists and to isolate terrorists and their organizations (psychologically and physically) from populations.<sup>57</sup> This facilitates their

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., III-6.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

subsequent neutralization or dismantlement through the direct approach and prevent their ability to reconstitute. Applications of the indirect approach (which focuses on IIA) require consistency and persistence in order to be fully effective.

### Inform and Influence Activities

IIA is the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform a nation and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision-making.<sup>58</sup> Messages and actions are synchronized with main themes in operations to inform and influence audiences in the area of operations and interest. Synchronization of messages and actions promotes and shapes the attitudes and behaviors of the audiences in the area of operations while affecting adversary or enemy information efforts.<sup>59</sup> Audiences include groups, organizations, and individuals. Information-related capabilities are capabilities, techniques, or activities employing information to carry out any of the dimensions within the information environment to generate an end(s).<sup>60</sup> Information-related capabilities that support IIA include, but are not limited to, public affairs operations, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), combat camera, Soldier and leader engagement, civil affairs operations, civil and cultural considerations.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>58</sup>Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-13, *Inform and Influence Activities* (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2013), 1-1.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

There are three dimensions of information environment: physical, informational, and cognitive.<sup>62</sup> The physical dimension consists of tangible and intangible elements used to enable flow of information among producers, users, audiences, and systems. The tangible elements include telecommunications, networks, printed publications, information systems and infrastructures, organizations, groups, people, satellites, meeting places, broadcast facilities, symbolic objects, billboards, flyers, and statues.<sup>63</sup> The intangible elements include transmission paths in the electromagnetic spectrum. The Informational dimension refers to content and flow of the information, like text or images, or data that can be collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and displayed.<sup>64</sup> The informational dimension provides the necessary link between the physical and cognitive dimensions. The cognitive dimensions are values, beliefs, concepts, intentions, and perceptions of individuals and groups transmitting and receiving information.<sup>65</sup> It focuses on cultural, religious, societal and historical contexts that influence the perceptions of those producing the information and of the target audiences.

### Inform Activities

Inform Activities is the IIA section that coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates the information-related capabilities application to accomplish a directed mission.<sup>66</sup> The

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 2-2.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 2-2 to 2-3.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 1-2.

global expanse of the information environment and technology enables news reports and analyses to rapidly influence public opinion and decisions.<sup>67</sup> Domestic and foreign audiences, including allies and international organizations can be informed of activities of an operation using the wide range of capabilities. Truth and transparency can mitigate the legitimacy of adversaries to a high degree.<sup>68</sup> Information-related capabilities such as public affairs, MISO, civil affairs operations, and others enables are exploited to inform both home and foreign audiences of actions and progress of an operation.<sup>69</sup> They also provide support to the military operations and strategic communication.

### Influence Activities

Influence Activities is the part of IIA that integrate and synchronizes the various means of influence to support operations.<sup>70</sup> It focuses on persuading foreign audiences to support a nation's objectives or to persuade those audiences to stop supporting the adversary or enemy. To accomplish operational objectives effectively, efforts are directed to shape, sway, or alter foreign audience behaviors. Victory may actually come from the ability to shape, sway, and alter foreign audience perceptions, and ultimately behavior, especially in the area of operations.<sup>71</sup> Information-related capabilities like MISO, public relations, etc can be harnessed to influence the targeted audiences in order to attain

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

desired end state. The use of strategic communication and influencing enemy decision-making process are also important in IIA.

#### Other Benefits of IIA

Achieving ultimate victory requires the capitulation of adversary decision makers. IIA provide options for effective, economical, and most operationally advantageous means to affect the enemy decision-making processes.<sup>72</sup> It provides messages and actions that create doubt from the individual level as well as deny enemy force's ability to make timely and effective decisions.<sup>73</sup> Information-related capabilities such as psychological and physical actions are employed to mitigate any advantage and gain the enemy may have on the information environment. They ultimately mitigate the enemy's decision making process and influence how audiences perceive the adversaries and their messages.

IIA also provides strategic communication which focuses on nation's efforts to advance its interests, policies, and objectives by understanding and engaging key audiences. The nation uses coordinated programs, plans, themes, and messages, synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power to create and strengthen conditions favorable for the achievement of the policies and objectives.

The employment of IIA in the counterterrorism effort remains one of the keys to combating terrorism. As an indirect approach, it creates, shapes, and maintains the environment that would enable the effective employment of direct approach. It ensures that the root causes of the problems are addressed. As a result, the terrorists lose support

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid., 1-3.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

and possible legitimacy and ultimately consider dropping their notion. It also ensures that a terrorism situation, once neutralized, does not re-emerge. One example that shows effectiveness of IIA in counterterrorism operation is in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan when the United States (U.S.) government conducted counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda.

#### IIA as Applied by the U.S. Government during OEF in Afghanistan

The U.S. military is currently withdrawing from Afghanistan after conducting a campaign that lasted for over ten years. The operation was conducted in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. by Al-Qaeda elements protected by the Taliban. The goal of the operation was to capture Osama bin Laden, destroy Al Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime that provided safe haven for the terrorists.<sup>74</sup> The successes achieved in the operation could not have been possible without the effect of IIA. One RAND National Defense Research Institute sponsored Review addressed the effectiveness of IIA in Afghanistan from late 2001 to 2010.<sup>75</sup>

Though the RAND sponsored review focuses mainly on the effectiveness of IIA themes and messages among Afghan targeted audience, it also reviewed some IIA that were counterproductive during the OEF. It also discusses IIA doctrine and organization

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<sup>74</sup>Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, *War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 2009), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40156.pdf> (accessed April 8, 2014).

<sup>75</sup>Arturo Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010* (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2012), [http://192.5.14.43/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND\\_MG1060.pdf](http://192.5.14.43/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf) (accessed January 14, 2014).

because of their impact on the effectiveness of messaging. Considering the difficulty in gathering reliable data for accurate assessment of the effectiveness of IIA in Afghanistan, the review presents a framework of analysis which relies heavily on cultural understanding of the target audiences.<sup>76</sup>

Three basic considerations were taken into account in assessing the effectiveness of IIA. One of the considerations is Credibility: how believable or reasonable the message content is to the target audience and how credible the messenger or means of dissemination is.<sup>77</sup> The second consideration is Appropriate cultural, social, political, or religious context: avoiding presenting psychological operation within a US frame of reference but that of the target audience.<sup>78</sup> The third consideration is Overall effectiveness: operation must show evidence that audience perception or behavior were influenced as intended.<sup>79</sup>

In considering the assessment of IIA also, the review looked at the IIA in terms of themes, products, and actions. Themes are subjects, topics, or line of persuasion used to achieve an IIA objective.<sup>80</sup> Products are visual, audio, or audiovisual items generated and disseminated in support of the IIA program.<sup>81</sup> Actions are activities conducted for their influence on targeted audience. After all considerations for assessment, the major themes

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<sup>76</sup>Ibid.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

and actions were rated as effective, mixed, or ineffective.<sup>82</sup> A theme or action is effective if the desired goals were achieved; mixed if the some but not all the goals were achieved; and ineffective if the desired goals were not achieved.

Judgments for the themes and actions were not made by means of quantitative or mechanistic formula. The RAND sponsored review did not do systematic post testing or use surveys or focus groups to more-precisely test target-audience reactions to specific IIA products.<sup>83</sup> Instead, it relied on more-subjective judgments based on the following sources: U.S. Military reporting from the field, including a series of Power Point briefings on specific campaigns; press reporting; public-opinion polls; academic studies; interviews conducted with U.S. military and civilian personnel.<sup>84</sup> The themes and actions considered were based on their influence on the culture and belief of Afghans. They were also selected because they have the ability to assist in understanding the target audience. The themes and actions as well as their overall assessment is shown in Table 1.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid.

Table 1. Themes and Overall assessment

Themes/Actions	Assessment		
	Effective	Mixed	Ineffective
The war on terror justifies U.S. intervention.			Ineffective
Coalition forces bring peace and progress.	Effective 2001–2005	Mixed 2006–2010	
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are enemies of the Afghan people.		Mixed	
Monetary rewards are offered for the capture of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders.			Ineffective
Monetary rewards are offered for turning in weapons.		Mixed	
Support of local Afghans is needed to eliminate IEDs.		Mixed	
U.S. forces have overwhelming technological superiority over the Taliban.	Effective 2001–2005	Mixed 2006–2010	
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Afghan National Security Forces bring peace and progress.		Mixed	
Democracy benefits Afghanistan, and all Afghans need to participate in elections.	Effective 2001–2005	Mixed 2006–2010	
Face to Face communication and engagement of key leaders (local, religious and political)	Effective		
Relationship with media		Mixed	
Countering the advisory propaganda		Mixed	
Reducing adversary popularity	Effective		
Convincing people to support the government and not the terrorist	Effective		
Adequately incorporate locals perception in terms of religion and nationalist sentiment		Mixed	

Source: Arturo Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010* (Virginia: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012), [http://192.5.14.43/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND\\_MG1060.pdf](http://192.5.14.43/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf) (accessed January 14, 2014).

Table 1 shows the usefulness of IIA in counterterrorism operation. It could also serve as reference model for any counterterrorism operation (Nigeria's inclusive) that

considers in detail, the indirect approach as an indispensable measure for a successful operation.

### The Emergence of Terrorism in Nigeria

It could be argued that terrorism was first experienced in Nigeria in October 1993, when a Nigerian Airbus A310 was hijacked to Benin Republic by members of Movement for Advancement of Democracy (MAD). However, terrorism in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon, but has only metamorphosed to professional level in recent times.<sup>86</sup> To confirm this, in the 1960s, political thugs were reported to be chasing opponents of their pay masters out of homes and murdering them and setting their property ablaze.<sup>87</sup> Kidnapping, armed robbery, torture and killing, which are acts of terrorism, were the prevalent form of influencing Nigerian politics at the time.

Similarly, Nigeria, especially from 1995 to 1998, faced a phenomenon of state terrorism affected by the regime of late General Sani Abacha.<sup>88</sup> This was attributed to the years that the then military Head of State wanted self-perpetuation in office; hence, he resorted to terrorizing citizens and his opponents. The Nigerian government paid dearly for this action through a collapsed economy and an insecure and unstable society. The list of terrorist attacks in Nigeria continues as indicated in the Table at Appendix A.<sup>89</sup> Having observed that terrorism is not novel in Nigeria, it is worthy to note that the recent trend of

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<sup>86</sup>Nwolise, “Terrorism: What is to be done about an emerging threat.”

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

rampant suicide bombings, killing of school children, and the like which is common with the BH is rather new.

### The Boko Haram Terrorist Group

Reports have differed on the dates and conditions under which BH came to existence in Nigeria. In 2002, the group apparently, was established by radical Muslim students that dropped out of the University of Maiduguri on the understanding that western education is a threat to Islamic religion.<sup>90</sup> Another claim is that the group was established in 2003 in Yobe State in the wake of Sharia implementation in some states in Northern Nigeria.<sup>91</sup> While the list goes on, average opinion is that an Islamic preacher, Ustaz Muhammad Yusuf, masterminded the birth of the group in Maiduguri in 2002.

Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf established a religious complex in 2002 and formed a prayer group called “Jama’atul Alhul Sunanah Lidda’wati wal Jihad.” The prayer group’s name is an Arabic expression which means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” The group’s original aim was to establish a fully Islamic state in Nigeria and ensure the implementation of Sharia law throughout the country.<sup>92</sup> Members of the group consisted largely of depressed northern Islamic students and

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<sup>90</sup>Umar Gusau, “Boko Haram: How it All Began,” Daily Trust, August 2, 2009, <http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index.php/the-arts/35-people-in-the-news/people-in-the-news/5869-boko-haram-how-it-all-began> (accessed October 7, 2013).

<sup>91</sup>Ismail Omipidan, “Boko Haram: How it all started,” Transparency for Nigeria, June 17, 2011, [http://transparencyn.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=4638:boko-haram-how-it-all-started&catid=60:guest](http://transparencyn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4638:boko-haram-how-it-all-started&catid=60:guest) (accessed October 26, 2013).

<sup>92</sup>Toni Johnson, “Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 7, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739#navigation> (accessed October 26, 2013).

clerics.<sup>93</sup> The group also had as members, radical Muslim university students, dropouts, and graduates, majority of whom are unemployed. Some followers may also be members of Nigeria's elites.<sup>94</sup> The group leader, in his teaching, criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he believed to be an illegitimate State. He then encouraged his members to withdraw from society and shun politics. He also encouraged them to disassociate from anything that had to do with western education on the understanding that the West is anti-Islam, hence, forbidden.

Considering the anti-West focus of the group, many northerners and subsequently the NG nicknamed the group, "Boko Haram" which means "Western education is a sin." The group also continued to oppose the ideas of secular authority. BH members are of the view that the secular authority is representative of a corrupt, illegitimate, Christian-dominated federal government.<sup>95</sup> The group's grievance worsened in the summer of 2009 when authorities in Bauchi State refused them the ability to preach or recruit publicly.<sup>96</sup>

In continuation of the disagreement with the NG, on June 11, 2009, an encounter between the group and police turned violent. This violence was caused by the blatant refusal of BH members to adhere to the Federal Government revitalized law on use of safety helmets by motorcycle users. An attempt by the Nigeria Police to clamp down on

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<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

<sup>95</sup>James Forest, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria," *Report of Joint Special Operation University*, 12, no. 5 (May 2012): 63.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid.

the offenders of the law resulted in gunfire exchange between them and the terrorists.<sup>97</sup>

Seventeen group members sustained gunshot injuries as a result of this clash; no deaths however were recorded. The resultant effect was the emergence of armed conflict in Bauchi state which later spread to other Northern states like, Bornu, Kano and Yobe.<sup>98</sup>

The violence began fully on July 26, 2009 when BH members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi state.<sup>99</sup> Within the next four days, the group attacked some Police Headquarters, a Primary School, a Maximum Security Prison, the National Directorate of Employment office, and several churches in neighboring Bornu State. Other attacks by the group within this period also included Federal Road Safety Commission office, National Population Commission office and some churches in Yobe State.<sup>100</sup> Kano was not left out of the violence as a Police Station was equally attacked by the group. The group overpowered the police and as a result, the Nigerian Army was directed to reinforce the police to bring the violence to an end.

This initial violence was eventually quelled by the joint operations of the police and military, coordinated by a special security task force, code named Operation Flush.<sup>101</sup> However, by the time the conflict was seemingly over, more than 800 people have

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<sup>97</sup>Ibid., 63.

<sup>98</sup>Johnson, “Boko Haram.”

<sup>99</sup>Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” 64.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid.

<sup>101</sup>Freedom C. Onuoha, “The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Explained,” *African Security Review*, July 12, 2010, [http://www.academia.edu/606822/The\\_Islamist\\_challenge\\_Nigerias\\_Boko\\_Haram\\_crisis\\_explained](http://www.academia.edu/606822/The_Islamist_challenge_Nigerias_Boko_Haram_crisis_explained) (accessed October 26, 2013).

reportedly been killed.<sup>102</sup> Many BH members were also arrested; and numerous cars, houses, churches and mosques were reported to have been burned. Significantly, Mohammed Yusuf, the group leader and his father in-law, Baa Fugu, were arrested by soldiers and handed over to the police who executed them.<sup>103</sup> This case attracted the attention of the international community as human rights advocates understood it to be extra-judicial killing. The police personnel that were involved in the killing were tried for murder in 2011.<sup>104</sup>

The period between the death of Mohammed Yusuf and prosecution of the alleged killers marked a turning point for BH.<sup>105</sup> The group, under the new leadership of Imam Shekau, Kabiru Sokoto and Sheikh Abu Muhammed, became more violent than before. The group had been infuriated by the alleged unjust killing of their premier leader, Yusuf; attacks by the group became rampant as a result. As in August 2009, the group was involved mostly in attacking the police, as well as provoking sectarian violence. The majority of attacks were aimed at Christians, using machetes and small arms. However, in late 2010, BH added Molotov cocktails and simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to its tactical inventory.<sup>106</sup> The series of attacks by the group are now too many to

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<sup>102</sup>Forest, *Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy*, 64.

<sup>103</sup>Onuoha, “The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Explained.”

<sup>104</sup>Tobi Soniyi, “Army Absolves Self from Killing of Boko Haram Leader,” *This Day Newspaper*, October 2011, <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/army-absolves-self-from-killing-of-boko-haram-leader/101257/> (accessed October 30, 2013).

<sup>105</sup>Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” 64.

<sup>106</sup>Scott Stewart, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Militants Remain a Regional Threat,” *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, January 26, 2012, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/nigerias-boko-haram-militants-remain-regional-threat> (accessed October 16, 2013).

record. A list of attacks by the group, from late 2010 till early 2012, as compiled by James Forest is at Appendix B for ease of reference.<sup>107</sup>

The mode and series of attacks by the sect has attracted international attention. Strong ties has been identified between the group and another African terrorist organization, Algeria’s Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).<sup>108</sup> In January 2010, AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel announced that the group would assist BH with training, personnel, and equipment.<sup>109</sup> Similarly, in November 2011, the BH’s official spokesman, Abu Qaqa, stated that they were in a close relationship with AQIM because they fight the same course.<sup>110</sup> On 22 November 2012, the Home Office of the United Kingdom listed BH as a Proscribed Terrorist Organization (PTO).<sup>111</sup> This means that “membership of, and support for, the organization is a criminal offence.” Designation of the group as a PTO was also tied to the group’s reported involvement in the May 2011 kidnapping and subsequent March 2012 murder of a British citizen in Nigeria.

Similarly, the U.S. Government, on June 21, 2013, only recognized the group leaders, Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi as “foreign

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<sup>107</sup>Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” 135-142.

<sup>108</sup>Committee on Homeland Security, “Boko Haram Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” September 13, 2013, <http://homeland.house.gov/boko-haram-growing-threat-us-homeland> (accessed October 16, 2013).

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid.

terrorists” and not the group itself.<sup>112</sup> This action by the U.S. Government was as a result of growing pressure on the Obama Administration to take stronger action against BH, which had stepped up attacks in Nigeria. The U.S. decision to list individual BH members as terrorists at that time, rather than the group itself, was informed by a desire not to elevate the group’s profile.<sup>113</sup> The status was however reviewed and the U.S. Government formally declared BH an International Terrorist Organization (ITO) on November 13, 2013.<sup>114</sup>

Of interest is that it was just on May 14, 2013 that the NG officially recognized BH as a terrorist organization.<sup>115</sup>

The change in the identity of BH from insurgents to a terrorist group seems to be as a result of their mode and rate of attacks. Their effect on the Nigerian people and Government has also made foreign countries like the U.S. and Great Britain to declare the group as terrorist organization. Considering the effect on Nigerians, the designation of the group as a terrorist organization has long been the request of Nigerians both at home and in diaspora. Though the new status of the group may increase their international link, the belief is that such a label will encourage better domestic and international coordination in

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<sup>112</sup>Andrew Quinn, “In First, U.S. Adds Boko Haram Members to ‘Terrorist’ List,” *Reuter*, June 21, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/21/us-usa-militants-bokoharam-idUSBRE85K19K20120621/> (accessed October 27, 2013).

<sup>113</sup>Ibid.

<sup>114</sup>Department of State, “Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru,” November 13, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217509.htm#> (accessed December 27, 2013).

<sup>115</sup>Kendra Zuhair, “Boko Haram: Terrorism and the Enabling Gaps in the Nigerian Polity,” October 1, 2013, <http://policyng.com/read.php?rid=43> (accessed October 27, 2013).

the fight against BH. Success in the fight will definitely lessen the group's effect on Nigerian society.

#### Effect of Boko Haram Terrorist Group on Nigeria

The BH terrorist group poses a serious threat to Nigeria, its citizenry, and foreigners in the country. Terrorist activities can result in the death of thousands and the rate of killings in Nigeria which have connections with the BH confirms that. To sum up the effects, they are visible in areas of security, economy, politics, and national unity, to mention but a few.

#### Security Challenges

The effect of BH terrorist activities on the security of life and property in Nigeria is alarming. BH attacks have resulted in loss of lives, numbering in the hundreds. Private and government properties have been destroyed owing to the attacks. People, especially those living in the northern part of the country, can no longer move freely because of the fear of attack by suicide bombers. People are afraid to go to their religious worship places. Many children no longer go to school for the fear of possible attacks. The people have been denied freedom of movement due to fear of BH attacks. Equally worrisome is that other ill-mannered people have taken undue advantage of BH's existence to unleash evil acts. One of the BH leaders, Sheikh Abu Mohammed Abdulazeez Ibn Idris, confirmed this, stating that the group is aware of the fact that some criminals have infiltrated their movement and continued to attack and kill people using their names.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>116</sup>Olaide I. Aro, "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Implication and Way Forwards toward Avoidance of Future Insurgency," Academic Edu, November 11, 2013, [https://www.academia.edu/3559251/boko\\_haram\\_insurgency\\_in\\_nigeria\\_its\\_implication](https://www.academia.edu/3559251/boko_haram_insurgency_in_nigeria_its_implication)

Similarly, the persistence of BH has exposed some lapses within the security agencies in Nigeria. Some attacks by the group on security forces like the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters in Abuja attests to this.<sup>117</sup> Though casualties are always heavier on the side of the BH terrorist group, the number of casualties on the Nigerian Security Forces' side calls for concern. This situation among others is alleged to have caused President Goodluck Jonathan to replace Service Chiefs in his administration, including the National Security Adviser.<sup>118</sup> The way in which the fight against BH terrorists has dragged on and the casualties so far recorded may have also reduced the confidence of the people on the capability of the security agencies.

#### Economic Effect

The NG has been thrown into serious economic stress as a result of attacks by BH terrorists. The level of investment and growth of businesses in the areas affected by BH is declining. For instance, Kano State, which has been the commercial centre of Western Sudan for the past 500 years, and of neighbouring countries like Niger Republic, Chad and northern Cameroun, is now a ghost of itself.<sup>119</sup> The 2011 Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development argues that a downturn in business activities caused by insecurity in Kano State alone has cost the Nigerian

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<sup>117</sup>[Ibid.](#)

<sup>118</sup>[Ibid.](#)

<sup>119</sup>John Shiklam, “How Boko Haram Activities Destroy Economy of the North,” *This Day*, August 20, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201208200123.html> (accessed November 27, 2013).

Economy N1.3trillion (\$6 billion).<sup>120</sup> Similarly, in Maiduguri, Bornu State, banks and their customers now operate under a difficult situation and have reduced their business hours to guard against being attacked by BH terrorists.<sup>121</sup> The commercial economic effect caused by BH attacks can only get worse if the group continues to thrive.

The economic effect of BH attacks on individuals or groups is also heavy. The Maiduguri Monday Market, the biggest market in the city, has been seriously affected as hundreds of shop owners, especially Southerners, have closed their businesses and left the troubled city.<sup>122</sup> In Kano State, about 35 percent of the over three million Igbo businessmen and traders in the city who engage in both small and medium scale businesses, have fled to Abuja and the South-Eastern Nigeria due to the growing insecurity caused BH.<sup>123</sup> Most of these people and groups that are fleeing their business areas have witnessed their shops or factories burnt down by the terrorists. Raising new capital to revitalize their business remains a big challenge, even as they relocate to new places. As a result of their threatened economic status, the effect on their living standards is traumatic.

#### Threat to Nigeria Unity

The threat posed by BH terrorists on the very unity of Nigeria is another issue that calls for serious concern. Nigeria as a country is heterogeneous in nature. It is a nation

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<sup>120</sup>Aro, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria.”

<sup>121</sup>Shiklam, “How Boko Haram Activities Destroy Economy of the North.”

<sup>122</sup>Ibid.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid.

that comprises of over 350 ethnic groups with people who speak over 4000 different languages. The country finds strength in her diversity. People travelled freely to any part of the country for livelihood. It is unfortunate that the advent of BH terrorism has threatened this love of country that the citizens share. Some Southerners that live in the troubled area of the North have been forced to leave for their respective native States as a result of the insecurity caused by BH terrorists. Similarly, occasions have occurred where some Christians in the North embark on reprisal attacks on mosques when churches are bombed by BH.<sup>124</sup> Some Christians in the Eastern part of the country have also threatened that there will be reprisal attacks on mosques if the Federal Government does not prevent the bombing of churches in the North.<sup>125</sup> These situations can result in polarization of the country; therefore BH is a serious threat to the unity that Nigeria currently enjoys.

#### Existing Efforts against Boko Haram Terrorists

The NG has neither neglected the capability of BH terrorists nor treated the effects of their attacks with laxity. Some Nigerian leaders have realized that the battle can never be over unless all parties are ready for some level of compromise.<sup>126</sup> Following a

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<sup>124</sup>Rawlings A Udama, “Understanding Nigeria Terrorism, its Implications to National Peace, Security, Unity and Sustainable Development: A Discuss,” *International Organization of Scientific Research Journal Of Humanities And Social Science*, <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:4qQ132No8FQJ:www.iosrjournals.org/ccount/click.php%3Fid%3D6202+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us> (accessed November 27, 2013).

<sup>125</sup>Ibid.

<sup>126</sup>Heather Murdock, “Nigeria Weighs War, Amnesty for Boko Haram,” Voice of America, July 2, 2013, <http://www.voanews.com/content/nigeria-weighs-war-amnesty-for-boko-haram/1693434.html> (accessed November 28, 2013).

series of debates by the leaders on how to end the whole peril, common answers have favoured crushing the BH terrorist group with military might or finding a way to address the group's grievances.<sup>127</sup> The difficulty is that the group seems to be faceless, refusing to appear before the general public or government representatives for dialogue. The NG on the other hand, has said that it cannot negotiate with a faceless organization.<sup>128</sup> Notwithstanding the clandestine nature of BH, the NG has applied some strategies in a bid to neutralizing the group. The aim has been to neutralize the group and prevent its re-emergence. As a result, the ways employed by NG has majorly been through "military operations" and "some level of diplomacy." These ways have been generated through "political will" and "the military." However, there is no clear strategy that addresses measures taken by NG to build Institutions that can respond to the needs of the society easily influenced by the insurgents or terrorists.<sup>129</sup>

### Military Approach

The Nigerian Army, in 2009, was directed to reinforce the Police in neutralizing the BH terrorist group when it became obvious that the task could not be handled by the police alone.<sup>130</sup> As a result, a Joint Task Force (JTF), comprising of the Army and other

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<sup>127</sup>Ibid.

<sup>128</sup>Ameh C Godwin, "Boko Haram: No amnesty for faceless group—Presidency replies northern leaders," *Daily Post*, April 1, 2013, <http://dailypost.ng/2013/04/01/boko-haram-no-amnesty-for-faceless-group-presidency-replies-northern-leaders/> (accessed November 28, 2013).

<sup>129</sup>Obedo Temitope, "Boko Haram Attacks: Counter Terrorism Guide for Schools," *Vanguard*, February 24, 2014, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/02/boko-haram-attacks-counter-terrorism-guidance-schools/>. (accessed March 11, 2014).

<sup>130</sup>Onuoha, "The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained."

security agencies was formed to bring a solution to the BH insurgency. The first phase of the task seemed successful as the group's activities drastically reduced after some military actions.<sup>131</sup> Surprisingly however, not long after the initial suppression of BH attacks, the group recommenced its attacks and at this time, in a bigger way. Unarguably, JTF in Maiduguri and other northern States where the BH thrives has been tremendously successful in the fight against this terrorist organization.<sup>132</sup> However, these achievements have not been gained without occasional setbacks.<sup>133</sup> Evidence of these setbacks can be seen in Appendix B which shows records of some of the BH attacks since inception. Lives, numbering in hundreds, have been lost and property worth millions of dollars destroyed as a result of BH attacks.

The attacks by BH, even with the JTF on-going operation in the Northern part of the country seem to be on the increase. While the group keeps losing its members to death or arrest by the JTF, their rate of attacks keeps devastating the NG and citizens. The wave of attacks and number of casualties attributed to the group made Dr. Goodluck Jonathan declare a state of emergency in the three Northern States where the group is most prevalent.<sup>134</sup> This declaration which affected Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa States is

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<sup>131</sup>Ibid.

<sup>132</sup>A. Niyi, "Chief of Army Staff Has Not 'Slept' Since 2010 Over Boko Haram," Information Nigeria, July 1, 2013, <http://www.informationng.com/2013/07/chief-of-army-staff-has-not-slept-since-2010-over-boko-haram.html> (accessed November 28, 2013).

<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

<sup>134</sup>Greg Botelho, "Nigerian President Declares Emergency in 3 States During Rebellion," CNN, May 14, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/14/world/africa/nigeria-violence/> (accessed December 10, 2013).

aimed at giving the military more leverage in fighting the terrorists. It gives the military unlimited access to any area where BH is suspected to be using as a hideout. This action, which was largely applauded by the Nigerian people, was also wished to have come earlier than it did.<sup>135</sup> The State of Emergency, which was declared on May 14, 2013, has recorded reasonable achievements in fighting the BH terrorist group.<sup>136</sup> More than 1,000 members of the group have been arrested within three months of the declaration.<sup>137</sup> But the question that is still begging for an answer is: ‘have attacks by the group subsided as a result’?

Still in line with the military action against the BH terrorists, and in connection with the declared State of Emergency, the NG established a new Army Division in North-Eastern part of the country in August 2013.<sup>138</sup> This new Division, named 7 Division, comprises over 8,000 personnel and is charged with taking over security of the North Eastern part of the country.<sup>139</sup> It is also to control the Nigeria borders with Niger, Chad and Northern Cameroon where intelligence has shown that terrorists get their training and

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<sup>135</sup>Callista A. Nnabueze, “Justification for the declaration of state of emergency in the three states in North Nigeria,” Federal Ministry of Information, May 28, 2013, <http://fmi.gov.ng/opinion/18180/> (accessed December 10, 2013).

<sup>136</sup>Senator Iroegbu, “DHQ: Over 1,000 Boko Haram Members Captured in Three Months,” *This Day*, August 9, 2013, <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/dhq-over-1-000-boko-haram-members-captured-in-three-months/155873/> (accessed December 10, 2013).

<sup>137</sup>Ibid.

<sup>138</sup>Kingsley Omonobi, “Jonathan creates new army division, sends 8,000 troops after Boko Haram,” *Vanguard*, August 18, 2013, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/jonathan-creates-new-army-division-sends-8000-troops-after-boko-haram/> (accessed December 10, 2013).

<sup>139</sup>Ibid.

launch bombing attacks on Nigeria.<sup>140</sup> The new Division is also designed to work hand-in-hand with the JTF in the area. It was also reported that the Division will gradually take over the duties of the JTF, which has been programmed to be scaled down with time. The new Division has also been reported to have made good successes since it became operational on August 22, 2013.<sup>141</sup>

Troops of 7 Division have conducted operations to pre-empt, dislocate and disrupt BH terrorists in the North-Eastern Nigeria. Terrorist camps located at Kitumari, Alkaderi, Kurunmati, Abali, Gajiram and Iza within the Sambisa Forest (in the North-East) were destroyed during these operations.<sup>142</sup> Very significant also is that one of the BH high commanders, Abba Goroma, was killed during one of the Division's operations.<sup>143</sup> Worrisome however, is that despite the successes made by the military, the terrorists seem not to be dropping in the number of attacks. The terrorist attack on the College of Agriculture, Yobe (50 kilometers away from Damaturu, the State capital), claimed the lives of more than 40 students on September 29, 2013.<sup>144</sup> This very attack came about four months into the declared state of emergency and one month after establishment of 7

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<sup>140</sup>Ibid.

<sup>141</sup>Sadiq Abubakar et al., "Nigeria: FG Deploys Soldiers in Nasarawa," allAfrica, September 19, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201309190203.html> (accessed December 10, 2013).

<sup>142</sup>Ibid.

<sup>143</sup>Ibid.

<sup>144</sup>Channel, "Update: Conflicting Figures Trail Yobe College Attack," September 29, 2013, <http://www.channelstv.com/home/2013/09/29/update-conflicting-figures-trail-yobe-college-attack/> (accessed December 12, 2013).

Division. This leaves one thinking whether there is something the stakeholders are not yet getting correctly.

For the purpose of this study, BH is considered a home grown terrorist group and the larger number of the group members live in the mist of Nigerians within the country. There is also the possibility that the group could be recruiting some of its members from neighbouring countries like Chad and Niger.<sup>145</sup> The military could be doing its best in intelligence gathering as it affects the operation in the region. Its efforts in winning the hearts and minds of the locals have been doubted by many.<sup>146</sup> Consequently, this research looks into the extent to which the NG and by extension, the military is involved in IIA vis-à-vis the fight against the BH terrorists.

#### Diplomatic Approach

During the initial stages of the BH attacks, the NG attempted to negotiate with BH in order to address their grievances.<sup>147</sup> This request did not succeed as the group consistently declined the offer.<sup>148</sup> The Nigerian President confirmed to Nigerians in a televised interview in November 2010 that though he was still ready for talks, there was

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<sup>145</sup>Michelle Faul, “Foreigners are fighting in Nigeria’s uprising, prisoner says,” *The Washington Post*, October 26, 2013, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreigners-are-fighting-in-nigerias-uprising-prisoner-says/2013/10/26/83ad3ffc-3e6f-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/foreigners-are-fighting-in-nigerias-uprising-prisoner-says/2013/10/26/83ad3ffc-3e6f-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c_story.html) (accessed December 12, 2013).

<sup>146</sup>Love Nigeria Foundation, “Between Joint Task Force and Boko Haram,” January 15, 2014, [http://lovenigeria.org/component/bloglayout/between-joint-task-force-and-boko-haram\\_54\\_1](http://lovenigeria.org/component/bloglayout/between-joint-task-force-and-boko-haram_54_1) (accessed February 7, 2013).

<sup>147</sup>Morgan L. Roach, “Boko Haram Broadens Attacks, Strikes U.N. Headquarters,” *The Foundry*, August 29, 2011, <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/08/29/boko-haram-broadens-attacks-strikes-u-n-headquarters/> (accessed February 7, 2014).

<sup>148</sup>Ibid.

no dialogue with BH. However, in August 2011, Nigeria began indirect negotiations with the group to seek a resolution of their problems.<sup>149</sup> This indirect method was based on recommendations by a panel tasked to negotiate with the group and provide amnesty for those who would renounce violence.<sup>150</sup>

One of the significant moves by the NG occurred on September 16, 2011 when the former president, Olusegun Obasanjo held talks with some members of BH in Maiduguri, Borno State. The meeting included a dialogue to end Government arrests and killings of the group's members, and payment of compensation to families of the members killed by security personnel.<sup>151</sup> Notwithstanding the dialogue, just a day after the former president left Maiduguri, BH terrorists killed the host that organized the meeting between Mr Obasanjo and the group. This could be one of the reasons why the NG did not adhere to the meeting report at the time.<sup>152</sup> Another reason for non-implementation of the report was that the President understood it to possibly be a ploy by some politicians to dupe the NG.<sup>153</sup> This therefore makes it difficult for the indirect method of negation to succeed.

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<sup>149</sup>Obinna Anyadike, “Analysis: Hurdles to Nigerian government-Boko Haram dialogue,” Integrated Regional Information Networks, November 28, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/analysis-hurdles-to-nigerian-government-boko-haram-dialogue> (accessed November 2, 2013).

<sup>150</sup>Ibid.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid.

<sup>152</sup>Aruga J. Omokaro and Oditta, Maxwell, “Nigeria: Boko Haram Kills Obasanjo's Host, Rejects Peace Move,” allAfrica, September 18, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201109180185.html> (accessed November 2, 2013).

<sup>153</sup>Anyadike, “Analysis: Hurdles to Nigerian government-Boko Haram dialogue.”

A new development seemed to spring up in November 2012 when a letter was allegedly released by the BH, requesting a dialogue with NG.<sup>154</sup> That the letter came barely 72 hours after a twin bomb attack which killed over 16 people in a church at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna State portrays insincerity. Additionally, the letter was released just three days after the military promised a reward of \$1.813 million to anyone with information that will lead to the arrest of 19 kingpins of the group.<sup>155</sup> As anticipated, not much was heard from the Government since the president had mentioned on November 18, 2012 that there was no discussions with the group.<sup>156</sup>

However, on April 17, 2013, the Federal Government took a fresh measure in search of an end to BH activities. The President constituted a 26 man Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, to handle BH terrorism.<sup>157</sup> This Committee was tasked to develop a framework for granting amnesty to BH members; it was also to design another framework through which the group would be peacefully disarmed within 60 days and the causes of their grievance addressed. Additionally, the Committee was to develop a programme through which victims of BH attacks could be supported. Worthy of note is that when the proposal for the amnesty was being deliberated upon (one week before the constitution of the

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<sup>154</sup>John Alechenu and David Attah, “Boko Haram writes FG asking for dialogue,” Punch, November 28, 2012, <http://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-writes-fg-asking-for-dialogue/> (accessed November 3, 2013).

<sup>155</sup>Ibid.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid

<sup>157</sup>Ibid.

Committee), the BH was reported to have rejected the offer of amnesty from the Federal Government.<sup>158</sup> The group based its refusal on the grounds that it had not done anything wrong to qualify for amnesty. This notwithstanding, the government constituted the Committee, which is yet to submit its report as at the commencement of this research.

NG continues to employ several means in the fight against BH terrorists. Nigerian allies like the U.S. and Great Britain have in one way or the other offered assistance in the fight. Their help has come in the form of training, equipment donation or diplomatic advice. The NG has made some achievements in the fight against BH terrorist group. The situation could have been worse if the Federal Government had not intervened in the ways it did so far. The group persistence and ever evolving attacks on civilians and security agents require that more effort is needed if the BH is to be neutralized. Consequently, the need to consult other literature on how to combat terrorism in Nigeria can only yield fruitful results.

#### Various Studies on How to End BH Terrorism

In the past, there were no security issues similar to BH terrorism in the country.<sup>159</sup> One study confirms that this could be the reason why the country is applying force through its military in counterterrorism operation vis-à-vis BH.<sup>160</sup> However, combating terrorism should not only be about the use of force; instead appropriate intelligence

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<sup>158</sup>Nick Chiles, “After Rejecting Nigeria’s Amnesty Offer, Boko Haram Continues to Kill,” *Atlanta Black Star*, April 23, 2013, <http://atlantablackstar.com/2013/04/23/after-rejecting-nigerias-amnesty-offer-boko-haram-continues-to-kill/> (accessed November 3, 2013).

<sup>159</sup>Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” 109.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid., 108.

efforts should be applied.<sup>161</sup> Counterterrorism should be focused on three areas: organizations, environmental conditions and perception.<sup>162</sup> Attacking the terrorist organization and their members as well as degrading their functional capabilities are major contributing factors to a successful counterterrorism in Nigeria.<sup>163</sup>

There is the need to address in detail, how the functional capabilities of BH could be degraded. It is also necessary to consider Nigeria's neighbouring countries in the North as potential contributors to the peace process. There is the need to influence these neighbouring countries into supporting Nigeria in the fight. Indeed, IIA is an inevitable tool to help neutralize the BH terrorist group in Nigeria.

Another study suggests that there are three solutions to BH terrorism.<sup>164</sup> The first, is that the religious and political leaders should talk with Dr. Datti Ahmed who is trusted by the BH group.<sup>165</sup> The second is that leaders of different Islamic Sects in the North should, in one voice, reach out to BH for a long lasting cease fire.<sup>166</sup> A third option is the use of force which comes with its own consequences since the military and other security agencies may not always live up to expectations.<sup>167</sup> Talking with the Islamic Leaders in

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<sup>161</sup>Ibid.

<sup>162</sup>Ibid., 109.

<sup>163</sup>Ibid.

<sup>164</sup>Femi Adi, "Federal Government must Parley Now with the Boko Haram," Sahara Reporters, May 7, 2012, <http://saharareporters.com/interview/fg-must-parley-now-boko-haram-shehu-sanni-the-news> accessed November 3, 2013).

<sup>165</sup>Ibid.

<sup>166</sup>Ibid.

<sup>167</sup>Ibid.

the Northern part of Nigeria to assist in the fight against BH is a good idea. However, it should be understood that they may not be the only people that could influence BH members. It is a good point to mention the use of force in neutralizing BH terrorism, but this could be better when people and organizations are influenced to support the military in the fight. Hence, addressing in detail, the indirect approach to counterterrorism vis-à-vis BH is very important.

At least, one study sees the possibility of BH terrorist group metamorphosing into global threat if not checked.<sup>168</sup> The study also believes inadequate social welfare is part of the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria. Consequently, the study it stresses the need for government to deal with basic issues like unemployment, poverty and other issues that make people prone to violence. Nigeria also needs to improve its border security as a measure to quelling BH terrorism. Similarly, the security agencies need to be strengthened to enable them perform their tasks better.<sup>169</sup> The points on providing basic needs for locals and enhancing border security are good, but there is the need to explain them in detail.

A different study explains that trauma caused by BH is an issue to be taken seriously.<sup>170</sup> In view of that, there is the need to alleviate the trauma on the victims of BH attacks. Relieving the victims of the trauma will weaken the BH terrorists. Subsequent measure should be to forgive any BH member who voluntarily surrenders while the ones

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<sup>168</sup>Onuoha, “The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis Explained.”

<sup>169</sup>Ibid.

<sup>170</sup>Allwell Okpi, “Extreme Force Not Solution to Boko Haram-Holt,” Punch, August 25, 2013, <http://www.punchng.com/politics/diplomatic-post/extreme-force-not-solution-to-boko-haram-holt/> (accessed November 3, 2013).

caught in the act should be brought to justice. The above ideas are however viable for long term measure.<sup>171</sup> Relieving the trauma on BH victims is good, but the fight against BH requires more efforts than that. Consequently, the combination of IIA and force may play vital role in combating BH terrorism.

The existing efforts and suggestions on how to neutralize BH terrorist group in Nigeria are good but none addresses in detail, the position of IIA in counterterrorism theory. This could be the reason why the terrorist group continues to grow in strength. Counterterrorism theory involves the use of both direct and indirect approaches. It emphasizes that neutralizing a terrorist group and preventing its re-emergence require efficient application of the indirect approach. The indirect approach, which focuses mainly on IIA, addresses the causes of terrorism and the need to resolve them. It also emphasizes on disconnecting the terrorist organization from its supports and devaluing them before the populace.

Neutralizing BH terrorist group in Nigeria requires the inclusion of effective IIA in the existing efforts. This may enable the NG to gain the required support from Nigerian citizens, allies and neighbors with respect to the fight against terrorism. Consequently, this research looks into a possible way of resolving the IIA aspect of counterterrorism with respect to the fight against BH terrorist group in Nigeria.

### Summary

This chapter reviewed key theories concerning terror, terrorism, and counterterrorism. It also provided a history of the BH terrorist group in Nigeria. It is

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<sup>171</sup>Ibid.

evident that a lot of work has been done on terrorism by scholars and many suggestions have been made with regard to the fight against BH terrorist group. This review indicates that BH is a threat that needs to be checked because the consequence of escalation beyond the present state is extremely dangerous. Consequently, suggestions have been made to combat the situation.

None of the approaches or suggestions on how to neutralize BH terrorist group considered in detail, the role of IIA in counterterrorism operations. IIA plays a vital role in counterterrorism theory. It falls under the indirect approach which must be given necessary attention if the terrorist organization must be neutralized successfully. The avoidance of re-emergence of neutralized terrorist organization also depends on the success of the indirect approach. This study therefore investigates the capabilities of IIA as an addendum to the existing measures to combatting terrorism in Nigeria.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine how the BH terrorist group in Nigeria can be neutralized. In the introduction to this thesis, the author provided background data and formed research questions that this study must answer. Chapter 2 reviewed the context of terror, terrorism, types of terrorism, counterterrorism theory, as well as history of terrorism in Nigeria and NG responses to it. It also identified that there is inadequate application of IIA in Nigeria's counterterrorism operations. Consequently, this chapter develops and explains a model to address IIA that could be applied in the counterterrorism operations in Nigeria and how the model can be tested. It also explains the analytical method to be used in the study. It further explains the sources used as well as the means of information collection.

#### Analytical Method

This study uses the descriptive qualitative analytical method of research. Descriptive qualitative analysis uses detailed descriptions of specific situation(s) from interviews, observations or document reviews. Because of research limitations, no interviews could be conducted for this study; observations and document review however were used. This research made maximum use of primary and secondary resources from the Combined Arm Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas–USA. Considering the age of BH and that no book has been published on the group as at the time of this

work, the research also utilized information from scholarly journals and popular media, including magazines and newspapers.

This research studied the IIA aspect of counterterrorism theory to aid in filling the observed gap in counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. The framework of IIA as contained in FM 3-13: Inform and Influence Activities 2013 was also studied as a guide to this research. One way to develop a model that may aid the neutralization of BH is to use the construct of operational approach to solving problem as contained in the Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operational Planning 2011.<sup>172</sup> The first step is to identify the current condition.<sup>173</sup> Then a desired end state is articulated. In order to achieve the desired end state, it is useful to establish LOEs that achieve desired effects. Then together, these effects will achieve the desired end state.

In the effort to aid neutralization of BH, this study therefore establishes an IIA model for counterterrorism operation in Nigeria in Figure 2. This model addresses IIA specifically which has been identified as inadequate in the current counterterrorism operations in Nigeria. Based on the observations by this research, the model has a very good chance of achieving the end state, which is to neutralize BH terrorist group. However, the model must be tested in order to be validated. Consequently, this study identifies certain IIA that must be accomplished for a successful IIA campaign to occur with respect to the fight against BH terrorist group. These activities were selected based on observations after studying the IIA as applied by the US Military in Afghanistan. The

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<sup>172</sup>Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chief of Staff, 2011), III-13 to III-15.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid.

study of the fight against the Maoist insurgents in Nepal (which has not seen much success until lately when the country began to apply IIA) also aided the selection of the activities.




Figure 2. IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria

*Source:* Created by the author.

The extreme left of figure 2 depicts the current condition with respect to the present counterterrorism operation in Nigeria which needs to be changed with the aid of IIA. The extreme right of the model shows the desired end state that must be attained at the end of the counterterrorism. There are three LOEs to the desired end state. LOE1 focuses on influencing Nigerian neighbors to assist in the fight against BH. It is the responsibility of the NG to influence its neighbors to achieve the effects along LOE1. LOE2 influences necessary Nigerian citizens into assisting the government in the

counterterrorism operation. It is the responsibility of the security agencies; religious and local leaders; key politicians, and the government to carry out the supporting objectives along LOE2 in order to achieve effect as shown in figure 2.

LOE3 is the Inform Activities. It is meant to inform Nigerian citizens of the efforts of the government in fighting the terrorist group. It also focuses on informing the international community of the efforts against the terrorist organization. It is the responsibility of NG and military to carry out the Inform Activities in order to achieve the effect along LOE3. The effects along the three LOEs were selected based on the fact that they will influence the will of the people which is known as one of the hubs of any terrorist organization. Achievement of the effects along the three LOEs results in attainment of the desired end state. Incorporation of the effects of IIA into the overall efforts of counterterrorism operation in Nigeria will help in neutralizing BH terrorist group and preventing its re-emergence. When the terrorists' identities are revealed and their weaknesses exploited, it will be relatively easy to neutralize the group. Discouraging the financiers of BH and devaluing the ideology of the group will prevent the re-emergence of the group after being neutralized. Once they are neutralized, it will also be easier to bring alleged culprits to justice.

### Testing the Model

The model in figure 2 is tested by comparing it with the IIA as applied in OEF, Afghanistan, earlier mentioned in chapter 2. The success that the U.S. government achieved during the OEF could not have been possible without the effect of IIA. Consequently, this research tests the IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria by comparing it with IIA during OEF in Afghanistan to ascertain its feasibility.

Table 2 outlines the parameters for testing the model against OEF. Column ‘b’ of the Table shows IIA as applied by the U.S. military in OEF. Column ‘c’ shows the result or effect of the action in Afghanistan while Column ‘d’ shows the potential effect if the same action is carried out in Nigeria vis-à-vis combating BH terrorists. Column ‘c’ will be rated as effective, mixed, or ineffective. It is effective if the aim was achieved in Afghanistan; mixed if some, but not all of the goals were achieved; and ineffective if the aim was not achieved. Similarly, Column ‘d’ will be rated as effective, mixed, or ineffective. It is effective if there is potential that the aim will be achieved in Nigeria; mixed if some, but not all the goals will be achieve; and ineffective if the aim of the action will not be achieved. Ultimately, there is an analysis of the actions in columns ‘c’ and ‘d’ to bring out the similarities or otherwise. The analysis is in descriptive form and considers that OEF took place in a different country while the fight against BH is within the Home Nation that is carrying out the operation.

Table 2. Parameters for Testing the IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria

Serial	Activities	Against Taliban	Against BH	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	Face to Face communication and engagement of key leaders (local, religious and political)			
2.	Relationship with media			
3.	Countering the adversary propaganda			
4.	Reducing the popularity of the adversary			
5.	Convincing the people to side the US/Nigerian Government			
6.	Offer of reward for information on the adversary			
7.	Adequately incorporate locals perception in terms of religion and nationalist sentiment			
8.	Monetary reward for turning in weapons			
9.	Identification of adversary as enemy of humanity			
10.	Informing the home citizens			
11.	Influencing allies.			

Source: Arturo Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010* (Virginia: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012), [http://192.5.14.43/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND\\_MG1060.pdf](http://192.5.14.43/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1060.pdf) (accessed January 14, 2014).

### Summary

This study seeks to contribute to the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. It exploits the effect of IIA in counterterrorism operations as a complement to the ways whereby BH terrorists in Nigeria could be neutralized. The way information is collected and carefully

analyzed is designed to put the situation in Nigeria in context and evaluate the effectiveness of IIA in the fight against BH terrorists. The descriptive qualitative analytical method of research used in this study analyzes the effects of IIA as vital measure that should be incorporated in the fight against BH terrorist group in Nigeria.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS OF IIA AS VITAL MEASURE IN NEUTRALIZING BH TERRORIST GROUP

This chapter analyzes how IIA could be applied by the NG to aid the neutralization of BH terrorist group in the country. Some research sub questions in this study have been treated through review of literature in chapter 2. Information from existing studies and literature were synthesized to get the answers to some of the sub questions. IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria, created in chapter 3 therefore assists in answering some of the sub questions that were not answered in chapter 2. The main question to be answered by this chapter is: What measure(s) could be adopted to successfully neutralize the BH terrorist group in Nigeria? The answer to the above mentioned sub question, combined with the answers to the previous sub questions will by default, answer the primary question of how BH terrorists group in Nigeria can be neutralized.

#### Analyzing The Model

Guided by the figure 2, this chapter commences by explaining the current condition with respect to the counterterrorism operation in Nigeria. The current condition is that the terrorists locations and financiers are unknown BH's strength and weaknesses are not fully understood. After explaining the current condition, the desired end state as contained in figure 2 will be explained. Thereafter the LOEs are explained as well as the effects to be achieved when the LOEs are accomplished.

### The Current Condition

One of the current conditions is that members of the BH terrorist group are not known. Revealing the identities of BH terrorists is vital to the success of counterterrorism operation in Nigeria. There may not be better people that will help in identifying who the members of the group are, than the locals in the troubled areas. According to this research, the majority of the members, especially key leaders of BH, are Nigerians and indigenes of the troubled areas or at least, their neighboring States. Some people among the locals therefore know BH membership, but are quiet, either for the fear of their own lives or just conniving with and concealing the group. The next classes of people that can aid in identifying the members of BH are the local and religious leaders in the troubled area.

According to this study, there is little happening in an area without the knowledge of the local leaders. These leaders have informants throughout each town and can confidently know who is doing or not doing what. Similarly, the religious, especially Islamic, leaders in the affected areas can assist heavily in identifying BH terrorists. The same thing applies to those countries neighboring Nigerian. The populace, local and religious leaders in those countries, especially the parts that have direct boundaries with Nigeria can help in identifying some members of the BH terrorists.

Another current condition is that the BH terrorist group locations are not known. To be able to neutralize the group effectively, it is necessary that their locations are identified. It is obvious that some of their meeting points may be in the jungle and desert. However, according to analysis by this research, the group holds meetings in some other areas within the metropolis or suburbs of the affected States or their neighboring States.

Consequently, the populace, local and religious leaders in these areas have serious roles to play in providing the information on where the terrorist group bases are located. Similarly, considering Nigerian neighboring countries, the populace, local and religious leaders at the regions that have boundaries with Nigeria could also be of immense help in this regards.

Lack of a full understanding about BH strengths and weaknesses is also one of the current conditions in Nigeria's counterterrorism operations. Knowing the strength and weaknesses of the BH terrorist group stands as one of the keys to neutralizing the organization. It is the knowledge of their strength and weaknesses that the NG, through diplomacy and military actions, would be able to exploit to obtain desired goals. The efforts of Nigerian intelligent organizations are very useful at this point. Working with the populace, local and religious leaders in the affected areas, the Nigerian intelligence outfit may be able to discover what the group's strengths and weaknesses are. Key politician in the affected States in particular, and Nigeria in general, may equally be of immense help. These politicians may be able to know among themselves, who sympathizes with or shares the group's ideology. Consequently, intelligent personnel, working with the right people, may be able to ascertain where the group is strong or weak for subsequent exploitation.

Another current condition as shown in figure 2, with respect to the fight against BH terrorist group, is that the financiers of BH terrorist group are not known. The BH group cannot function without money. The fact that the group raises part of their fund

from bank robberies is not in doubt.<sup>174</sup> It has also been confirmed that BH raises part of its funds from its members as well as Al Qaeda.<sup>175</sup> The above notwithstanding, there may be some prominent and wealthy Nigerians who as well sponsor the group, mainly for political, religious and selfish reasons. Deciphering these individuals will assist in neutralizing the BH group. Key politicians from the affected states in particular and the rest of Nigeria could be of great help in answering question of who finances BH. The populace, local and religious leaders in the affected States could equally be of help. It is when all, or most, of BH funding sources are known that efforts to interdict its funds will be effective.

#### The Desired End State

With the full understanding of the current condition, vis-à-vis the fight against BH, the next action is to determine the desired end state to be achieved at the end of the counterterrorism operation. According to this study, and as shown in figure 2, the desired end state after the successful accomplishment of the IIA model for counterterrorism in Nigeria is that BH terrorist group is neutralized. Attainment of this desired end state however, is only possible if the effects along the three LOEs are achieved. These effects will enable the NG to influence the will of the people to support government efforts

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<sup>174</sup>Tobi Soniyi and Iroegbuin Senator, “Seven Boko Haram Members Arraigned for Bank Robbery,” *This Day*, February 21, 2013, <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/seven-boko-haram-members-arraigned-for-bank-robbery/140114> (accessed December 31, 2013).<sup>175</sup>Kimeng H. Ndukong, “Nigeria: Boko Haram's Funding Sources Uncovered,” allAfrica, February 14, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201202141514.html> (accessed December 31, 2013).

<sup>175</sup>Kimeng H. Ndukong, “Nigeria: Boko Haram's Funding Sources Uncovered,” allAfrica, February 14, 2012, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201202141514.html> (accessed December 31, 2013).

against the BH terrorists and ultimately neutralize the group and prevent its re-emergence.

#### Analyzing LOE1: Influencing Neighboring Countries

LOE1, as mentioned in Chapter 3, focuses on influencing Nigeria neighbors to assist in the fight against BH terrorist group. The countries to be considered at this point are the ones bordering Nigeria to the North, North East and South East; they are Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroun respectively. It is the responsibility of NG to influence these countries to assist in achieving its desired effects. It is through the respective country's government that the populace, local and religious leaders in the areas suspected to be sympathetic to the terrorists can be influenced. The supporting objectives are to: provide social welfare support to inhabitants of areas in the neighboring countries where terrorists are suspected to assemble and recruit members, and work with neighboring countries to increase security at the international borders. The desired effects along LOE1 are: Foreign supports are discouraged, and BH Terrorists identities are revealed.

#### Supporting Objective 1: Social Welfare Support

It has been confirmed that BH recruits some of its members from neighboring countries like Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroun.<sup>176</sup> There have been occasions where BH members fled to those neighboring countries when pursued by JTF troops. This means that the group may also have bases in these countries. For BH group to thrive in

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<sup>176</sup>Michael Olugbode, “Nigeria: Insurgent - Foreign Fighters, Doctors With Boko Haram,” *This Day*, October 27, 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201310281131.html>. (accessed January 1, 2014).

these areas, some among the locals must be actively assisting BH. Similarly, many causes must exist to make it possible for some individuals from these countries to join BH. Among such causes may include, but are not limited to, unemployment, poverty, religious bigotry, poor living standard, and illiteracy. Persuading these individuals not to avail themselves for recruitment requires influence of the respective local and national governments.

Since the availability of the citizens of these neighboring countries for BH recruitment is majorly attributed to religion bias, lack of basic amenities, and poor social lives in general, there is the need to address these root causes as well. It is possible that the countries in question may not have the means to adequately address these problems. It may also be that the efforts of the respective government to meet the basic needs of the locals in these areas are being frustrated by some individuals for selfish reasons. Effective Influence Activities on these countries and their citizens will definitely make the populace to shun BH and reveal any of the group's members or supporters within their locality.

Influencing Nigerian neighbors requires NG diplomatic engagement with the neighboring countries' respective governments. The immediate goal will be to influence them to upgrade their administrative behavior toward their own citizens. There is no fault in going in to improve the economic status of these neighboring countries. This will be with the agreement that bulk of the aid from Nigeria will be channeled to the improvement of social welfare of the parts of the respective country, where BH activities are suspected. It will cost Nigeria lots of money but the fact remains that the benefit of such action significantly outweighs the cost. This effort should energize the respective

country's government into influencing the populace, local and religious leaders in those areas to assist in exposing the BH members and making their place unconducive for the terrorists. NG may even go as far as awarding scholarships to indigenes of these areas to study in Nigeria or their respective countries. The NG through the respective neighboring countries' governments may even persuade the locals with the offer of reward for information on the adversary or monetary reward for any members who agrees to surrender voluntarily. All these efforts may naturally influence Nigerian neighbors to improve their support to NG against BH terrorist group. With their behavior being influenced, it may be easier to counter the propaganda of the BH group in their various countries, reducing their popularity and denying the group of potential recruits.

#### Supporting Objective 2: Increase Border Security

The porous boundaries between Nigeria and its neighbors is another problem that needs to be addressed. Nigeria shares about 773km border stretch with Benin Republic, 87km with Chad, a stretch of 1,049km with Niger Republic and 1,690km with Cameroon.<sup>177</sup> Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) confirmed that there are about 1,487 illegal routes into Nigeria through these porous borders.<sup>178</sup> BH members take advantage of these porous borders to advance their cause. It is easy for them to smuggle weapons, ammunition, explosives, and recruits through these borders without much resistance.

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<sup>177</sup>Lekan Abayomi, "Boko Haram: Foreign Terror Via Nigeria's Porous Borders, the Urgent Matter of National Security," News Rescue, April 12, 2013, <http://newsrescue.com/boko-haram-foreign-terror-via-nigerias-porous-borders-the-urgent-matter-of-national-security/#axzz2wHx151B1> (accessed January 1, 2014).

<sup>178</sup>Ibid.

Worrisome is the report that Nigerian effort to close this gap is too slow.<sup>179</sup>

Notwithstanding, it is common knowledge that the issue of border security is the responsibility of the countries involved. Influencing the government of the respective countries to partner effectively with Nigeria, especially with respect to border security, becomes indispensable.

Though security pacts have been signed by NG and the neighboring countries, the extent to which Nigeria assists these countries with military training and equipment is unconfirmed. It would be necessary to improve the military relationship between Nigeria and its neighbors. This will also include the relationship between NIS and the immigration services of the respective neighboring countries. Deliberate effort should be made by Nigeria and its neighbors in closing the loopholes that currently bedevil their international borders. With stronger bilateral corporation and substantial aids, in terms of military training and equipment, as well as economics development, the behavior of the Nigeria neighbors with respect to border security may improve. Acts, in turn, frustrate the effort of the terrorist in smuggling their weapons, equipment and personnel across the borders. It may also prevent the terrorists from accessing citizens of these countries for possible recruitment and support.

The explanations given above demonstrate that there are different ways that the NG can influence the behavior of its neighbor to support Nigeria in its fight against BH terrorists. Nigeria has had cordial relationship with all her neighbors, except for occasional border disputes with Chad and Cameroun. At those times of dispute (1982 and 1983), there were pressures from some Nigerians that military actions should be taken

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<sup>179</sup>Ibid.

against those countries, but the NG took the reverse measure, soft power.<sup>180</sup> Similarly, a longstanding dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun over the potentially oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula was settled by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which awarded most of the Peninsula and Maritime rights to Cameroun.<sup>181</sup> Nigeria obeyed the ICJ ruling by signing on 12 June 2006 an agreement, to adhere to the Court decision and not proceed on option of military action.<sup>182</sup> Management of the cordial relationship between Nigeria and her neighbors has rested mainly on Nigeria, even at a huge cost.<sup>183</sup> Regardless, Nigeria, in the quest to uphold its foreign policy principles of respect for equality of States, their sovereignty, and independence, has continued to maintain good relationship with these countries. The NG also takes its obligation to partner, and when necessary, champion the promotion of African unity.<sup>184</sup> In view of these, it is possible for Nigeria to persuade her neighbors to support NG in the fight against BH terrorist group.

While the success of influencing Nigerian neighbors lies mainly on the NG direct and serious diplomatic engagement with the neighboring countries, the effort of the media cannot be underplayed. The media have big role in the Influence Activities with regard to the fight against BH terrorist group. There is the need for NG to double its

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<sup>180</sup>Dauda Garuba, “Nigeria and regional integration in West Africa,” Barcelona Center for International Affairs, December 31, 2008, [www.cidob.org/en/content/download/7506/79124/.../01\\_batalla\\_eng.pdf](http://www.cidob.org/en/content/download/7506/79124/.../01_batalla_eng.pdf) (accessed January 1, 2014).

<sup>181</sup>Nigerian Government. “Foreign Relations,” October 29, 2012, <http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46/foreign-relations>. (accessed January 1, 2014).

<sup>182</sup>Ibid.

<sup>183</sup>Garuba, “Nigeria and regional integration in West Africa.”

<sup>184</sup>Ibid.

efforts in conveying to the media, the truth concerning the actions against BH. As a corollary, the independent media (in a bid to maintain credibility) will convey to the world, the truth about BH and the NG actions against the group.

#### Assessment of Effectiveness

Influence Activities on Nigerian neighboring countries is important with respect to the fight against BH terrorists. If the measures in LOE1 are applied by the NG, the outcome may be very useful in neutralizing BH terrorist group. These measures, though will cost Nigeria a lot of money, may be helpful and the outcome may be rewarding. Significant impact on the social welfare of residents of the suspected areas in Nigerian neighboring countries may change their behavior in so many ways. They may no longer sympathize with the BH terrorist group and may not avail themselves for recruitment. Some of the already recruited members may consider voluntary surrender, especially with a promise of security, good live, and immediate monetary reward. Local and religious leaders may also assist in revealing any suspected member or sympathizer of the BH terrorist group within their locality. They may assist in ensuring that their communities are not being used as meeting points for the group. Influencing these countries to assist in effective control of their respective borders with Nigeria may also be very useful. It may help in collapsing the confidence of the terrorists as they will not be able to flee across the borders when pursued by the JTF and smuggling-in of arms and ammunition will now be an impossible task. They will also not be able to have easy access to the citizens of these countries for possible recruit and support.

In relation to OEF, influencing Afghan government and populace by the U.S government was one of the determinant factors that led to the success America achieved

in Afghanistan. The same thing applies to the U.S. influence on Afghanistan's neighbor, Pakistan. According to this research, the economic and military relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan before and during OEF in Afghanistan, facilitated the Influence Activities on these two countries. Also, just like Nigeria and its neighbors, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is porous.<sup>185</sup> As a result, it enabled terrorists from Afghanistan to flee into the frontier region of Pakistan where they were provided safe haven by the local tribal communities.<sup>186</sup> Consequently, during OEF, the U.S government carried the Influence Activities up to the borders of the two countries.<sup>187</sup> The U.S. military supplied food and other essential materials to the communities along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The action was accompanied by leaflets and radio broadcasts announcing these food drops. Evidently, these gestures were appreciated and helped to generate a positive U.S. image at that time (2001–2005).<sup>188</sup>

The good influence later declined because of the U.S. sequel tactics which included bombing villages and conducting night raids which the Pashtun people viewed as offensive.<sup>189</sup> Decline in positive image of Nigeria may not be the case when it comes to Influence Activities on its neighbors since the Nigerian military will not be deploying

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<sup>185</sup>Sikander A Shah, "War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan," Washington University Global Studies Law, 2010, [http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume9\\_1/Shah.pdf](http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume9_1/Shah.pdf). (accessed January 15, 2014).

<sup>186</sup>Ibid.

<sup>187</sup>Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*.

<sup>188</sup>Ibid.

<sup>189</sup>Ibid.

or conducting offensive operations in these countries. Citizens of the respective countries are only required to shun the BH and report the group's activities in their locality to their respective government who will take necessary actions based on their agreement with Nigeria.

Another example effectiveness of IIA is the effect of the bilateral agreement between Nepal and India with respect to border security to check the activities of Maoist terrorist group operating in Nepal. The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), which was formed in 1995 following a split in the CPN-Unity Centre, resorted to armed struggle on February 1996.<sup>190</sup> The group which denounced CPN-Unified Marxist-Leninists (CPN-UML) became notorious with attacks on police stations in northwestern Nepal and thereby declaring a 'People's War' in Nepal.<sup>191</sup> In many ways, this disrupted developmental, economic, political and social programs in Nepal. One of the measures taken by the Nepalese government in neutralizing the group and its activities was to influence its neighbor, India, to assist with border security among other programs and initiatives.

Soon after a collapsed ceasefire in Nepal in 2001, the country engaged in serious diplomatic meetings with India for full support and cooperation at all levels in meeting the challenges posed by the Maoists.<sup>192</sup> As a result, India declared the Maoist group in

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<sup>190</sup>South Asia Terrorism Portal, "Communist Party of Nepal–Moist," 2001, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/terroristoutfits/index.html> (accessed January 20, 2014).

<sup>191</sup>Ibid.

<sup>192</sup>Nalini Jha, "Domestic Turbulence in Nepal: Origin, Dimensions and India's Policy Options," Academia.edu, [https://www.academia.edu/4156994/Domestic\\_](https://www.academia.edu/4156994/Domestic_)

Nepal as terrorists and increased action against them.<sup>193</sup> The border areas were kept on “high alert” to check the movements of the Maoists. Their possible hideouts in the border districts and towns were also regularly searched. Maoist activists found at the border areas were arrested and handed over to the Nepalese Government for prosecution.<sup>194</sup> These diplomatic and security actions between Nepal and India resulted in intensified efforts by the two countries in the cooperation to combat terrorism and cross-border crimes to include sharing intelligence and information regarding terrorists’ movements. Considering the similarity between the Nigeria situation and the case of Nepal, part of a possible solution to BH may come from NG influencing its neighbors vis-à-vis their behavior towards border security.

#### Analyzing LOE2: Influence Home Citizens

LOE2 as shown in Figure 2 focuses on influencing the Nigerian Citizens within the troubled areas to assist NG in neutralizing BH terrorist group. According to the research, this group of people is referred to as “Necessary Nigerian citizens within the country.” It is the responsibility of the security agencies; religious and local leaders; key politicians, and the government to carry out the supporting objectives along LOE2 in order to achieve the desired effect. The supporting objectives are to: Improve the social welfare of necessary citizens within the terrorized zones; Work on the religious and political ideology of citizens in the troubled area; and Weaken terrorists resolve. The

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Turbulence\_in\_Nepal-Origin\_Dimensions\_and\_Indias\_Policy\_Options (accessed January 20, 2014).

<sup>193</sup>Ibid.

<sup>194</sup>Ibid.

desired effects along LOE2 are that: BH sympathizers are discouraged; Nigerian unity is improved; BH terrorists Identities are revealed; and BH financiers are discouraged.

### Supporting Objective 3: Improve Social Welfare

The peculiarity of Nigeria's fight against BH requires that specific Nigerian citizens within the country be influenced in order to change their behavior with respect to the fight against BH. The BH terrorist group finds the environment in which they currently operate conducive, and that may be why they still thrive there. Majority of the BH group may be from the troubled areas or their neighboring States. It is therefore not possible for the group to remain indefinitely invisible. There may be some locals who know some of the members of the group, but refuse to reveal them due to fear of their own lives or deliberate connivance with the group. There is also the possibility that some of the locals sympathize with the group for other reasons best known to them.

So many reasons can contribute to the situations that result in BH terrorist group attracting sympathy and to continuing to thrive in the affected States. Unemployment, poor living standard, poverty, religious bias, and illiteracy are just some of the conditions that make people turn to BH. When the unemployment situation in an area becomes too high, a popular saying is that "an idle man is the devil's workshop" must be considered. It is relatively easy for the BH terrorist group to convince and recruit unemployed youths who may have fruitlessly searched for job even with good educational qualifications. The same thing applies to a situation where an area is suffering from poor living standard, poverty, and illiteracy.

Influencing specific individuals within Nigeria requires the efforts of the military, local and religious leaders, key politicians as well as Federal, State, and Local

Governments. The immediate goal should be to persuade the people into revealing BH identity; discourage sympathizers and financiers; as well as garner support for Nigerian unity. Since poor social welfare have been identified as one of the main factors that the BH use to gain support from some individuals and recruit members, improving the people's living standard becomes indispensable in this fight. A situation where the locals in an area are deprived of the basic needs of life, they may naturally turn to violent people without any coercion from BH. It is possible the NG is making an effort to improve the living standard of the people in the remote areas of the troubled States. However, the process may be too slow and more should be done by the government. The Federal government as well as the State and Local governments in the affected areas, have to take extra measures to ensure that the people's social welfare is not compromised. Like many countries in the world, corruption is always an enemy of progress. As a result, measures must be put in place by the government to ensure that any effort to alleviate the life of these locals is monitored to the latter.

As the living standard of the people is being obviously and visibly improved, it may be easier to convince the local and religious leaders to support the NG against BH. The local and religious leaders may have more basis to convey the intent of the government to the people, urging them not to sympathize with the BH. These leaders will probably be more enthusiastic to assist the government, especially when they are assured that the living standard of the people improves as days pass by. Similarly, the locals themselves may see no reason to avail themselves for recruitment by the BH when there is better life in the absence of violence. Instead, they may be ready to give any information that may assist in revealing the identity and even the financiers of BH

terrorists. The military commanders operating in the troubled States could be empowered both financially and otherwise to assist in the provision of these basic needs to the people. This may again let the people know that the military is there to assist them live better life by any legal means possible.

On the issue of provision of employment for the people with good educational qualifications, the government at various levels could make special provision to provide employment for the majority of this class of people. For the ones without educational qualification, the military commanders working in the areas could employ them as laborers in some constructions jobs in their respective zones. This may give them some sense of responsibility and belonging, being that they are seen as partners to the development of their areas. Of note is that employing them for the menial jobs should not mean they are to receive very poor wages. Instead, their wages should be reasonable enough for them to live an average life and be happy. This effort may influence the youths into believing that being on government side is better than joining BH. They may most likely assist the government with any vital information that may lead to identification of BH members, hideouts, and financiers.

On the issue of illiteracy, the NG is already putting efforts to see that interested families in Northern Nigeria send their children to school. In the recent past, there were more Islamic than Modern schools in Northern Nigeria.<sup>195</sup> This did not provide solution for the knowledge that people require in this age and time. Instead, it provided room for kids to be let loose in the streets, begging for aids. This class of kids is called Almajiris.

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<sup>195</sup>Global Uncertainty, “Improving education in Northern Nigeria,” May 2, 2013, <http://www.globaluncertainties.org.uk/news-events/improving-education-in-northern-nigeria.aspx>. (accessed January 5, 2014).

The word ‘Almajiri’ came from Arabic word ‘Almuhajir’ which means ‘immigrant’.<sup>196</sup>

The name was given to qur’anic pupils in Northern Nigeria, for they left their home towns usually to other places or to popular teachers to obtain sound qur’anic education.<sup>197</sup>

Additionally, the Almajiri is a general name given to both destitute and qur’anic students.<sup>198</sup> Both classes of Almajiris are reported to be beggars at different levels. While the destitute Almajiris beg all the time, the student Almajiris only beg for alms at specified time; after school, during break or on school-free days.<sup>199</sup> The BH terrorists recruit many Almajiris into their group.<sup>200</sup> Influencing these Almajiris into shunning BH requires channeling their ideology into modern and moral society. Consequently, the NG has established several schools for the Almajiris in Northern Nigeria where they will be kept away from the streets and BH influence.<sup>201</sup> In line with this commendable effort, this study holds that an effective monitoring system should be put in place by the NG to ensure that the reasons for establishing the schools are not jeopardized. It also holds that

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<sup>196</sup> Mahmud Muhammad, “Almajiri: Beyond the Rhetorics,” Gamji, 2013, <http://www.gamji.com/article8000/NEWS8006.htm> (accessed January 5, 2014).

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>200</sup> John Alechenu, “Boko Haram paid us N5,000 each to burn schools–Kid suspects,” Punch, June 1, 2013, <http://www.punchng.com/news/boko-haram-paid-us-n5000-each-to-burn-schools-kid-suspects/> (accessed January 5, 2014).

<sup>201</sup> Favour Nnabugwu, “Jonathan launches school for Almajiri in Sokoto,” *Vanguard*, April 11, 2013, <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/jonathan-launches-school-for-almajiri-in-sokoto/> (accessed January 5, 2014).

the elementary and secondary education in Northern Nigeria should not only be free but compulsory for every child.

#### Supporting Objective 4: Change Ideology

A serious concern also is the issue of religious bigotry. It is obvious that some of the BH recruits are victims of religious brainwash. They may have been exposed to some teachings which are contrary to the principles of Islamic religion. Consequently, they now believe that they are fighting a Holy war and anybody that is not with them deserves to die.<sup>202</sup> Influencing the behavior the local and religious leaders in the troubled zones is therefore necessary with respect to the fight against BH terrorist group. They are to be convinced on the need to improve their leadership and preaching skills in order to be able to dissuade people from joining, supporting, or financing BH terrorist group.

In addition to the religious ideology as a possible cause of BH terrorists' persistence, the political side of the problems is also important. There have been allegations and counter allegations that some politicians have association with the BH terrorist group. It is difficult to believe that the success of BH is without any support from some political elites for their selfish interest. Nigerian President noted that some sympathizers of the group come from some members of the arms of government.<sup>203</sup> There have also been suspicions that some political elites in Borno States financed the group

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<sup>202</sup>Isaac Abrak, "Boko Haram Rebels say Nigerian Military Offensive is Failing," *Reuter*, May 29, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/29/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSBRE94S0GT20130529> (accessed January 2, 2014).

<sup>203</sup>Ahamefula Ogbu, "Jonathan: Boko Haram in Govt, Threat Worse Than Civil War," *This Day*, January 8, 2012, <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/jonathan-boko-haram-in-govt-threat-worse-than-civil-war/106713/> (accessed January 3, 2014).

and its founder, Mohammed Yusuf.<sup>204</sup> Those politicians were accused of relying on the popular support which the then BH leader could amass in favor of electoral victory during 2003 and 2007 general elections.<sup>205</sup> In general, politicians who associate themselves with BH's leadership capitalize on the ability of the group to mobilize broad support from its members.<sup>206</sup> Identifying these politicians that sympathize with BH, though may be a herculean task, is possible. Success may start from influencing key leaders as well as Nigerian politicians to assist in identifying suspected BH financiers.

Denying BH financial support from any politician requires honest and patriotic efforts of other key politicians. Politicians, to a very good extent, know themselves and can say what someone is doing or capable of doing. In view of that, they, especially the key politicians, should come together and point out who should or should not be suspected. This may go a long way in helping the intelligence agencies in their investigations. This may not be easy, but it is necessary to mersuade the politicians to act in the interest of the country. Where the politicians are important again is in the area of representing the zones or people well. Those politicians from the troubled zones should try to live up to expectation in order to gain trust from the people they represent. This may not only promote democratic values, but may encourage the people to provide them with necessary information that could assist the NG neutralize BH.

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<sup>204</sup>Akinola Olojo, "Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram," International Center for Counter-Terrorism, October 2013, <http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2014).

<sup>205</sup>Ibid.

<sup>206</sup>Ibid.

In addition to the need to persuade politicians to serve in the interest of Nigeria unity, the intelligence branches of the respective security agencies need to work harder. It could be the same intelligent bodies that informed the President that some politicians sympathize with and finance the BH terrorists. Consequently, it is the responsibility of the Intelligence Agencies to dig deeper and identify these suspected enemies of Nigeria, and submit them for investigations and prosecution. They should psychologically engage some key politicians to reveal any information they know concerning who may be supporting BH among their colleagues. The NG could also liaise with her allies for sophisticated intelligent equipment which currently may not be in its inventory, but required for this important task.

#### Supporting Objective 5: Weaken Terrorist Resolve

Weakening the terrorist resolve is one of the key objectives that may guarantee the attainment of the effects along LOE2. There must be BH members who did not voluntarily join but were forced into the group. Testimony from one of the captured members of the BH affirms that some of the members joined as a result of threat to their lives by the group.<sup>207</sup> Some of them also may have joined in ignorance; only to find themselves in a situation where withdrawal from the group becomes too difficult as they

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<sup>207</sup> Michael Olugbode, “My Brother Forced Me into Boko Haram,” *This Day*, October 27, 2013, <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/my-brother-forced-me-into-boko-haram/162722/> (accessed January 3, 2013).<sup>208</sup> James Bwala and Sabiu Mohammed, “Confession of Boko Haram member: Why we can’t surrender As gunmen set mosque ablaze, kill 3 in Zamfara,” Tribune, October 27, 2013, <http://tribune.com.ng/news013/index.php/en/component/k2/item/24912-confession-of-boko-haram-member-why-we-can%E2%80%99t-surrender-%E2%80%A2as-gunned-set-mosque-ablaze,-kill-3-in-zamfara.html> (accessed January 3, 2014).

could be killed if found trying to abscond.<sup>208</sup> There are also some people who may have shared the group's ideology at the beginning and joined as members but have changed their mind and wish to quit. However, quitting may seem impossible to them, knowing the repercussion if caught by members that are still devoted to the group. Consequently, this study holds that it will be highly advantageous to the fight against BH if the behavior (surrounded by fear) of such people is influenced toward voluntary surrender.

For the purpose of this study, the category of the BH members to be influenced is broken down into captured members and the active ones. Considering the captured members, the military should try to persuade them into revealing the identity of the ones that are yet to be captured as well as their hideouts and financiers. They could be promised money, freedom and a good life as psychological means of getting them to cooperate and release useful informations. As for the active members of the BH, they should be promised freedom for voluntarily surrendering themselves. Since they may be afraid of being attacked by their group for decamping, it is necessary that they are promised maximum security if they voluntarily surrender. All these measures may help in weakening the resolve of the BH and enabling the NG neutralize the group accordingly.

The effort of the media in the Influence Activities with respect to necessary Nigerian citizens within the country is important at all levels. As the NG and military convey the truth concerning their efforts against BH and how peacefull environment

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<sup>208</sup>James Bwala and Sabiu Mohammed, "Confession of Boko Haram member: Why we can't surrender As gunmen set mosque ablaze, kill 3 in Zamfara," Tribune, October 27, 2013, <http://tribune.com.ng/news013/index.php/en/component/k2/item/24912-confession-of-boko-haram-member-why-we-can%E2%80%99t-surrender-%E2%80%A2as-gunned-set-mosque-ablaze,-kill-3-in-zamfara.html> (accessed January 3, 2014).

fosters good living, the media may convey same to the locals in the affected areas. This could encourage some locals into supporting the efforts of the government against BH terrorist group. Similarly, when the military public relation office is transparent to the media, the latter may also convey to the general public the NG intent to forgive any BH member that voluntarily surrenders. In the same vein, some active members of BH may take advantage of such condition and surrender voluntarily.

#### Assessment of Effectiveness

Influence Activities on specific Nigerian citizens living in the country can be very helpful in the bid to neutralize BH terrorists. If the Influence Activities as outlined in LOE2 or even more are applied, success may be guaranteed in the fight against BH. A situation where people from the troubled areas (with good educational qualification) are gainfully employed, it is natural that majority of them may support the government. As a result, they may come to despise BH terrorist group and reveal critical information that may enable the NG neutralize the group. A situation where the social welfare and educational system in affected areas are obviously and continually improved, the influence on the local and religious leaders may be fruitful. These leaders may see more things to stand on and dissuade their followers from joining or sympathizing with the BH terrorist group. Similarly, the NG and military being faithful to their promises of assured security and monetary reward for voluntary surrender by the BH members may also aid the government bid in neutralizing the terrorist group. In the same vein, if key politicians in Nigeria are influenced to identify suspected sympathizers and financiers of the BH terrorist group, then the end of BH may be near. Similar results may be achieved if the

effort of the government and the military are fruitful with respect to discrediting the BH before the locals in particular and Nigerian populace at large.

During OEF, the U.S. government and military influence themes and messages focused on creating sharp distinction between U.S. forces and the terrorist group (Al-Qaeda).<sup>209</sup> The goal was to make the Afghan citizens support the U.S. who aimed to bring peace, stability, and progress to the people and despise the terrorists who were spreading violence and destruction.<sup>210</sup> Messages focused on specific acts of destruction that the terrorists commit, such as burning girls' schools and attacking Afghan and foreign aid workers implementing diverse projects that benefit the community.<sup>211</sup> The U.S. government and military provided the villages with concrete benefits that they appreciated; projects pursued included providing electricity to villagers, buying desks for schools, providing food aid, outfitting a medical clinic, and even paying for solar energy panels for the roof of a school.<sup>212</sup> These messages were effective as the majority of the locals began to support the Afghan Government and U.S. military and resist the terrorists.<sup>213</sup> Nigerian situation may benefit from a similar effect if the social welfare of the people of the area is significantly improved. It may also avert the possibility of reemergence of the group when neutralized.

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<sup>209</sup>Munoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan*.

<sup>210</sup>Ibid.

<sup>211</sup>Ibid.

<sup>212</sup>Ibid.

<sup>213</sup>Ibid.

There were also messages that focused on discrediting the Al Qaeda and Taliban Islamic ideology.<sup>214</sup> The messages accused the terrorists who claimed to be Islamic holy warriors, of not being Islamic and violating Islamic rules of just war. Afghan citizens had started lamenting among themselves on how their country was fast becoming the home of suicide bombers.<sup>215</sup> OEF exploited this situation and convinced many people to shun terrorists' religious ideology and hold unto the Islamic rule of just war.<sup>216</sup> Meetings were held between delegates from U.S. military and local as well as religious leaders of the areas of operation. This further developed confidence between the U.S. forces and the locals. The demonstration of genuine concern and giving the villagers humanitarian aid and right religious guidance quickly developed a feeling of trust with the people and their religious and local leaders. Through such relationships, the Afghans began providing the U.S. military with information regarding locations and plans of Al Qaida and Taliban sympathizers.<sup>217</sup> Relating this to the Nigeria situation, the number of civilians that died as result of BH attacks has already made many people doubt the group's credibility. The NG and military can take advantage of this situation and can highlight the poor morality of the BH group and reduce their sympathizers, financiers, and potential recruits.

There were also messages that focused on influencing terrorists to voluntarily turn in their weapons during OEF. Promises of monetary rewards and security for such

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<sup>214</sup>Ibid.

<sup>215</sup>Ibid.

<sup>216</sup>Ibid.

<sup>217</sup>Ibid.

individuals were kept.<sup>218</sup> Consequently, some terrorists turned in their weapons, benefited from the promises, and defected from terrorist organization. The offer of monetary reward for turning in weapons was very useful as it produced good results. It assisted in depleting the number and capabilities of the terrorist organization. Individuals that were yet to join the terrorist group were also dissuaded from joining as they could easily turn in their weapons and be rewarded bountifully. This further reduced the number of people that could easily avail themselves for recruitment by the terrorists. Similar effects are expected to happen in Nigeria if the promise of huge monetary rewards and security is provided for BH group defectors and potential recruits.

Similar messages that focused on influencing terrorists to voluntarily turn in their weapons yielded fruit when used against the Maoist terrorists in Nepal. The active members of the group were promised money, freedom and good life as psychological means of getting them to voluntarily surrender themselves. The resultant effect was the voluntary surrender of about 700 members of the group.<sup>219</sup> Similar effect may be achieved when such measures are employed against BH terrorist group, hence weakening the strength of the group and enabling the NG in neutralizing it.

#### Analyzing LOE3: Inform Home and Foreign Audiences

LOE3 is Inform Activities and focuses on informing Nigerian citizens, both at home and in diaspora, of the efforts and activities of the government with regards to the

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<sup>218</sup>Ibid.

<sup>219</sup>Chandra B. Khanduri, “Counterinsurgency Operation in Nepal,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, April 10, 2002, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/counter-insurgency-operations-in-nepal-720.html> (accessed December 26, 2013).

fight against the BH terrorists. It also focuses on informing the international community of Nigerian efforts against the BH. It is the responsibility of the NG and military to carry out the supporting objectives in order to achieve the desired effect along LOE3. The supporting objectives along this LOE are to: Inform Nigerian citizens of the government actions against BH terrorist group; and Inform foreign audience of the actions against the terrorist group. The desired effects along LOE2 are that: NG gained support from Nigerians; NG gained support from International community.

#### Supporting Objective 6: Inform Nigerian Citizens

The need to inform Nigerian citizens of the government efforts and strategy against the BH terrorists cannot be overemphasized. Keeping them informed may not only give confidence to the people with respect to the responsibility of the government, but also clear any doubt that may arise as a result. It will also leave an open door for positive suggestions, information or supports from any well-meaning Nigerian.

The BH terrorist group and their activities are no longer strange to Nigerians. Every well-meaning Nigerian wishes to see the end of the group as soon as practicable. Many individuals, groups, and organizations within the country have criticized the activities of BH and urged the government to rescue the situation with any means legally possible. This outcry by the people requires attention and response, but it should be done with care. Human beings by their nature will react differently to one action or the other. First, keeping citizens informed of government efforts and successes in the fight against BH is important. The way this information is conveyed is equally important. There will be the need to know the audience that is being addressed at any given time so that the right information is relayed to them, using the right terms and media. Similarly, any

action of the government or security agencies that may interfere with the rights of individuals or groups requires to be handled with appropriate caution. This may not only explain to the people the need for any action taken by the government, but also deny the BH group the possibility of taking undue advantage of the action to garner sympathizers and recruits. Well coordinated efforts to inform Nigerian citizens of the actions of the government against BH may ultimately influence the people into supporting the government in the counterterrorism operation.

It is the responsibility of the NG to inform the Nigerian people as well as the international community of the efforts of the government in fighting the BH terrorists. The military also has its role in this very task. The immediate aim will be to inform the necessary audience of the desire and actions of the government to neutralize the BH terrorist group. It will also help informing them of the need to take some serious measures like monitoring individual and group communication so that the BH members and sympathizers can easily be revealed and prosecuted. Many people may be against the government if they are not openly informed of such serious actions like monitoring of communications. Consequently, the government should keep the citizens informed of its efforts and successes in the fight against BH. This will not only encourage the people to support the government but also degrade the terrorists.

#### Supporting Objective 7: Inform Foreign Audiences

It is important that the international community is kept abreast of the efforts of Nigeria against the BH terrorists. This will clear the air on the ways that the government is using to fight the terrorists. The danger of keeping the international community in the dark with regards to the Nigerian actions against BH is better imagined. Hence, necessary

bodies; global, regional and sub-regional must be informed of Nigeria efforts against the terrorists.

It has been reported by the Amnesty International that the NG is not doing enough to deal with BH terrorism.<sup>220</sup> Such report by an international body may have been informed by the continuous attack by the BH group on Nigerian populace. It could also be that they are under-informed of the efforts of the NG in the fight against BH. The negative impact of such understanding and reaction from such an international body or other international bodies does no good to the efforts of the NG in the fight against BH. It may not only portray Nigeria as a failed state, but may encourage the terrorist in their acts. The need to keep all the important bodies abreast of the Nigerian efforts as well as the legality therefore cannot be overstressed.

It may be fruitful for the NG to send the required diplomatic delegates to keep the international community abreast of the government efforts in neutralizing the BH. The military public relations should also be directly involved in this role. Successes achieved by the government against the terrorists should also be aired for all to hear and note. This may ward off any misconstruction by any international organization. It is not possible to abruptly overcome BH or any other terrorist group at once. It is hard to say, but the truth is that the terrorists achieve limited successes from time to time. This however does not mean that they are winning the fight. The necessary bodies should therefore be made to understand the strategy involved in counterterrorism, especially with respect to BH

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<sup>220</sup>Bob Doughty, “Amnesty Condemns School Attacks in Nigeria,” VOA Learning English, October 16, 2013, <http://learningenglish.voanews.com/content/amnesty-condemns-school-attacks-in-northern-nigeria/1767755.html> (accessed January 11, 2014).

terrorist group. If this is well conveyed, support as well as positive reactions and comments may come from the international community vis-à-vis NG efforts in neutralizing the BH terrorist group. It will also be weakening the stronghold of the group, since it will be clear to them that the entire world is against them.

#### **Accomplishment of the Desired Effect along the Three LOEs**

If the effects along the three LOEs are achieved, they will ultimately result in influencing the will of the people against BH terrorist group. People that hitherto supported the group both financially and otherwise may begin to work with the government against BH. Potential recruits may change their mind and shun the group. Supports from Nigerian citizens and international community in the fight against BH may also increase. All these situations may therefore result into the attainment of the desired end state, which is to neutralize BH terrorist group

#### **Testing The Model**

Inclusion of effective IIA by NG and security agencies in the fight against BH will assist in neutralizing the group and preventing its re-emergence. The effect of IIA could be quick and enduring. The peculiarity of NG fight against BH gives confidence that IIA model for counterterrorism as outlined in Figure 2 may be effective. However, as earlier mentioned, it is necessary that the effect be tested by comparing it with the OEF that took place in Afghanistan. In doing so, some of the themes and activities used by the RAND sponsored study on OEF, Afghanistan will be used for the testing. The reason for using some, and not all, of themes and actions as used in OEF is because of the peculiarity of the Nigeria situation; operation is carried out by Nigeria on its own land.

Consequently, this research carefully selected the actions that could exist in Nigeria situation. The actions are: Face to face communication and engagement of key leaders (religious, local, and political); Relationship with Media; Countering the adversary propaganda; Reducing the popularity of the adversary; Convincing people to support the government and not the terrorists; Ability to adequately incorporate local perception in terms of religious and nationalist sentiment; Offer of reward for information on the adversary; Monetary reward for turning in weapons; Identifying the terrorists as enemy of humanity; Informing the home citizens; and Influencing allies and neighboring countries.

Similar to the RAND sponsored study also, the selected actions are rated as effective, mixed, or ineffective. An action is effective if the desired goals are achieved; mixed if some, but not all, the goals are achieved; and ineffective if the desired goals are not achieved. According to this research, the above rating will assist in determining whether the IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria will be rewarding or not. The comparison is as shown in table 2.

Table 3. Comparing the IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria with IIA in OEF, Afghanistan

Serial	Activities	Against Al Qaeda	Against BH
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Face to face communication and engagement of key leaders (religious, local, and political)	Effective	Effective
2.	Relationship with Media	Mixed	Effective
3.	Countering the adversary propaganda	Mixed	Effective
4.	Reducing the popularity of the adversary	Effective	Effective
5.	Convincing people to support the government and not the terrorists	Effective	Effective
6.	Ability to adequately incorporate local perception in terms of religious and nationalist sentiment	Mixed	Effective
7.	Offer of reward for information on the adversary	Mixed	Mixed
8.	Monetary reward for turning in weapons	Mixed	Mixed
9.	Identifying the terrorists as enemy of humanity	Mixed	Effective
10.	Informing the home citizens	Effective	Effective
11.	Influencing allies and neighboring countries.	Effective	Effective

*Source:* Created by the Author.

Table 3 shows that the results of some actions during OEF were ‘effective’ while some were ‘mixed’. If similar actions are taken against BH terrorist in Nigeria, some of the actions may be ‘effective’ and some, ‘mixed’. Considering the peculiarity of the counterterrorism operation in Nigeria when compared with OEF, some of the results of the actions in Afghanistan that were ‘mixed’ may be ‘effective’. The results that may be ‘mixed’ in Nigeria case may improve to ‘effective’ with time and when Nigerian culture is considered. The reasons for the ratings of the result of the activities against BH terrorist group is discussed in chapter 5.

## Summary

This chapter analyzed the IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria. The three LOEs in the Model were used to fill the gap in counterterrorism operation going on in Nigeria. Analyzing IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria answered the sub question; what measure(s) could be adopted to successfully neutralize the BH terrorist group in Nigeria? This answer, combined with the answers to the previous sub questions answered how BH terrorists in Nigeria can be neutralized. The IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria was tested by comparing it with the OEF in Afghanistan. RAND sponsored review of OEF, Afghanistan was used as a testing standard for the Model. There was emphasis on the peculiarity of Nigeria situation which could make the IIA more effective in Nigeria as against the OEF, Afghanistan. In nutshell, the incorporation of effective IIA in the fight against BH is required for the neutralization of the group and preventing its re-emergence.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

The purpose of this study is to suggest measures that could be applied by NG to effectively neutralize BH terrorist group in the country. The research assesses IIA as an approach that must be effectively employed to augment the current effort of the government in order to successfully neutralize BH terrorist group and prevent its re-emergence. Having analyzed how IIA can be employed in the fight against BH terrorist group in the preceding chapter, this chapter concludes the study and explains the result of the model that was developed and tested in chapter 4. It also makes recommendations for application of the result of the analysis and recommends areas of further study vis-à-vis the counterterrorism operation in Nigeria.

#### Conclusion

The author, in introducing the topic, gave a brief description of Nigeria and how conflicts had existed in the country, including the emergence of BH terrorist group. The evolution of terrorism was also mentioned. Religious, sectorial, and political differences as well as poor or lack of social welfare were identified to have led some individuals and groups to use terrorism as a tool to achieving their ends.

In accomplishing the purpose of the research, the author made a broad review of literature concerning terror and terrorism. Types, causes and effect of terrorism were also reviewed. Types of terrorism were identified to be political, criminal, repressive, state, revolutionary, and sub-revolutionary terrorisms. Ethno-nationalism, discrimination,

religion, socio-economic status, political grievances, and accidental guerrilla were observed as the root causes of terrorism. The effects of terrorism on the society were identified to include, but are not limited to death, physical injury and pain, emotional stress, kidnapping, human rights abuse, destruction of property and infrastructure, fear, mental agony, and economy disruption.

Counterterrorism theory was also studied as a guide toward achieving the purpose of the research. The counterterrorism framework was noted to have five logical LOEs which are further divided into two approaches; direct and indirect approaches. The approaches were identified to focus mainly on the use of force and IIA respectively. It was observed that successful neutralization of any terrorist group and preventing its re-emergence requires effective application of the indirect approach which emphasizes the use of IIA. The IIA as used in OEF, Afghanistan was given as an example of how effective IIA could be in counterterrorism operations.

Considering the two approaches that constitute counterterrorism theory and the NG efforts against BH terrorist group, the author observed that the country has primarily used the direct approach against the terrorists. Though some level of successes were noted to have been achieved by the NG in the fight against BH terrorist group, the increasing rate of attacks by the group were observed to be devastating the Nigeria State. The attacks were identified to have negatively affected Nigerian economy and security and currently pose threat to Nigerian unity. Scholarly ideas on how the group can be neutralized were also studied. The author deduced that there is inadequacy in IIA regarding the current counterterrorism operation against BH terrorist group.

Consequently, there was the need to develop a model that could fill the inadequacy identified in the counterterrorism operation going on in Nigeria.

The methodology used by the author was based on the doctrinal framework as established in the literature review. The research identified that one way of developing a model to fill the gap of inadequate use of IIA in the fight against BH terrorist group could be to apply the construct of operational approach to solving problems. The U.S. Joint Operational Planning doctrine was then studied as a guide and authority to the development of the approach. Consequently, the author created a model; IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria, which could be applied to complement the efforts of NG against BH terrorist group. The model was then tested for feasibility by comparing it with the IIA as applied by the U.S. military during OEF in Afghanistan.

The Model as developed by the author first of all analyzed the current condition that must be changed. It then developed a desired end state that must be achieved at the end of a successful counterterrorism operation. Based on the terrorists' end state and hub for operation, three LOEs were developed in the Model that could lead to neutralizing the BH terrorist group. The mechanisms for two of the LOEs were Influence Activities while the third LOE was Inform Activities. The LOEs were tailored to achieve some desired effects which if successfully accomplished may together lead to the attainment of the desired end state (How to neutralize BH terrorist group). Step by step, the model was analyzed and tested for workability.

Testing the Model required that the peculiarity of the counterterrorism operation in Nigeria be considered. The uniqueness that the operation is conducted by NG within its home land; Nigeria culture; and the author's knowledge of the country were put into

consideration. As a result, the author came up with the following analysis after considering the result in table 3:

#### Face to face Communication and Engagement of Key Leaders (Religious, Local, and Political)

Face to face communication and engagement of key leaders was effective during OEF. The same result is likely when applied in Nigeria with respect to the fight against BH terrorist group. The reason why it may be effective in Nigeria is that all parties to the engagement are Nigerian citizens with familiar culture. Hence, it may be easy to build and sustain confidence between the people and government as well as the security agencies.

#### Relationship with Media

The result of the U.S. relationship with the media during OEF, Afghanistan was mixed. It is probable that NG relationship with the media may be effective with respect to the fight against BH terrorist group. The reason why the result of NG relationship with the media may be effective is because the latter are already victims of BH attacks and generally want an end to it. Moreso, the media would want to maintain credibility by conveying to the public, the truth concerning the counterterrorism operation as told by the NG.

#### Countering the Adversary Propaganda

Contering the adversary propaganda produced a mixed result during OEF. It is however likely to produce an effective result in Nigeria because many Nigerian Muslims understand that the BH is not fighting a Holy war. Many Nigerian Muslims also are

victims of the BH attacks and are calling on the government to deliver them from the situation.

#### Reducing the Popularity of the Adversary

The result of reducing the popularity of the adversary during OEF, Afghanistan was effective. Similar situation may prevail in Nigeria with respect to the counterterrorism operation going on in the the country. This may be effective in Nigeria because many Nigerians are victims of the BH attacks and wish that the government brings solutions to the problem as soon as possible.

#### Convincing People to Support the Government and not the Terrorists

Convincing people to support the government and not the terrorists during OEF yielded effective result. Effective result also is likely when such action is applied to Nigeria situation. The reason is that many Nigerians are already victims of the BH attacks and wish that the government brings solutions to the problem as soon as possible.

#### Ability to Adequately Incorporate local Perception in Terms of Religious and Nationalist Sentiment

The ability to adequately incorporate local perception in terms of religious and nationalist sentiment produced a mixed result during OEF. The result of the action however may be effective in Nigeria because BH is a home grown and many Nigerians are Muslims and understand the culture and religion of the locals in the troubled zones.

#### Offer of Reward for Information on the Adversary

The result of offer of reward for information on the adversary during OEF was mixed. The result of the action was mixed in Afghanistan because of the fear of the

terrorists or they doubted if the U.S. would honor their promises. Similar result is expected in Nigeria for same reasons. The effect may improve if people see honesty in fulfilling the promises.

#### Monetary Reward for Turning in Weapons

The result of monetary reward for turning in weapons was mixed in Afghanistan because of the fear of the terrorist or they doubted if the U.S. would honor their promises. Similar result is expected in Nigeria for same reasons. The effect may improve if people see honesty in fulfilling the promises.

#### Identifying the Terrorists as Enemy of Humanity

Identifying the terrorists as enemy of humanity yielded a mixed result. The result of the action was mixed in Afghanistan because the terrorist had many supporters before the intervention of the U.S. In Nigeria case, the action may be effective because no well-meaning Nigeria has ever supported BH openly, more so as many people are victims of the BH attack.

#### Informing the Home Citizens

The result of informing American citizens during OEF was effective. Similar result is expected in Nigeria situation as the majority of the citizens wish to know what the government is doing to neutralize BH in order to pledge their support accordingly.

#### Influencing Allies and Neighboring Countries

The result of influencing allies and neighboring countries was effective during OEF, Afghanistan. Such action is expected be effective when used against BH terrorist group in Nigeria. This will be effective since Nigerian allies are already giving their

support to the NG in the fight against BH. It will also be possible as Nigerian neighbors are aware that their countries may be the next victim of BH if the group activities escalate beyond present condition.

#### Validation Ratings Justification and Recommendations for NG in its fight against BH

The analysis in chapter 4 suggests that though the NG is committing much effort in the counterterrorism operation in the country, more should be done in the area of IIA. This is necessary in order to ensure that the BH terrorist group is successfully neutralized and prevented from re-emerging. The recommendations made as a result of the findings of this research are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

#### Comprehensive Diplomatic Engagement with Nigerian Neighbors

It is obvious that the counterterrorism may not attain the desired success without a deliberate assistance from the governments of Republic of Niger, Chad, and Cameroun. It is necessary that these countries are influenced into helping Nigeria in the fight against BH terrorist group. Being that some BH members have been noticed to always flee to these countries means that the group may have been granted safe haven by some citizens of the countries. The issue of porous borders between Nigeria and these countries also cannot be overemphasized. There is the need for all the countries involved to jointly and effectively secure these borders in order to weaken and subsequently neutralize the terrorist group.

Consequently, the NG should improve comprehensively, its relationship with these countries, especially in the area of security. With that, securing the borders between Nigeria and its neighbors will be more effective and relatively easier. The NG should also

consider assisting these countries economically, with the aim of enhancing the social welfare of the inhabitants of those areas were BH activities are suspected. These may ultimately influence the people into supporting their respective government and NG by extension in the fight against BH terrorist group. As a result, the terrorist will be denied the possibility of supports and recruitment from these countries.

### Enhancing the Social Welfare of Nigerians in the Troubled Areas

Poor social welfare has been identified as one of the root causes of terrorism. It has also been observed that social welfare in most of the terrorized areas in Nigeria is poor. This may have made some inhabitants of the areas to avail themselves to BH terrorist group for recruitment. It may also have made some individuals from the areas to be indifferent in the counterterrorism operation by the NG. Consequently, improving the social welfare of these set of people may stand as one the indispensable measures to successful counterterrorism operation in Nigeria.

The NG therefore needs to make deliberate effort to improve the social welfare of the inhabitants of the areas affected by the activities of BH terrorist group. These could include, but are not limited to, provision of employment; construction of schools and making education compulsory for all, up to secondary school level at the minimum; providing them with better health system; road structure; farming aids; food; and cloths. Though the NG has already embarked on some of these projects like construction of schools, the current situation requires that more should be done in order to psychologically influence these people to support the government as required.

## Influencing People's Ideology

It has been established that BH terrorist group persuade people into joining or supporting them by making them believe that the group is fighting a Holy War. This may mean that those people that succumb to the persuasions are not well grounded in the teachings of Islamic religion. It may also mean that there are some Islamic teachers who covertly teach their followers to believe that non-Muslims deserve to die. All these need to be corrected so that people in the troubled areas begin to understand that it is the BH ideology that is probably wrong.

The NG therefore needs to improve on its intelligence gathering to reveal those Muslim teachers that preach violence instead of peace. It should also work with Nigerian Muslim leaders to ensure that only certified preachers are allowed to teach in the mosques. The military public relation office and the NG should also be engaged in influencing people's ideology in favor of the Nigeria. These efforts may discourage people from availing themselves for recruitment by the BH terrorist group. It may also dissuade both current and potential supporters as well as financiers of the group.

Similar to the religious ideology, some politicians are of the belief that it is proper for them to attain their political objectives using whatever measure(s), whether right or wrong. As a result they tend to support the BH terrorist group in order to employ the services of the group. The group could help them mobilize voters by intimidation or persuasion. This set of politicians could also encourage the BH terrorist group to distort and disrupt the activities of the government so that citizens lose confidence in government.

One way of influencing the political ideology of these politicians is by identifying those ones that believe that ‘the end justifies the means’. This requires the efforts of fellow politicians who the government should urge to assist for the sake of Nigeria unity. The intelligent agencies are also to develop measures to untangle this. With the help of fellow politicians and the intelligent agencies, those politicians that support and finance the terrorist group will be identified, investigated, and prosecuted. It will also act as a deterrent to any politician that has the potentials of embarking on the politics of ‘the end justifies the means’. With these in place, the BH terrorist group’s support and finances may be reduced, paving way for subsequent neutralization of the group.

#### Improving the Information Operations Structure

Successful IIA require effective information operation structure. To be able to influence active or captured BH members requires effective psychological operations. This is possible through effective information operation structure. Consequently, it is recommended that NG and military improve any existing information operation structure in order to effectively execute psychological operation related task. The structures should be capable of making information operations to be more focused, proactive, and responsive.

The usefulness of the media in IIA cannot be overemphasized. The current era where many people reach out to media for information requires that organization that is meant to succeed must embrace the media. It is therefore important that the NG should always be truthful and transparent to the media. The government should do more in conveying their stories for the truth to be known. The media may, in doing their mormal duties, shape the operational environment by revealing the actions and initiatives of the

NG with regard to the fight against BH terrorist group. NG should also establish television stations, newspapers, posters, flyers, and radio stations which would be used solely for psychological operations. Generally, NG can gain more support from home and foreign audiences by conveying its efforts against the BH terrorist group.

#### Recommendations for Further Study

This study only identified the need for adequate IIA to be incorporated in the current counterterrorism operation going on in Nigeria. The research holds that a deeper study into the indirect approach to counterterrorism operations could reveal more effectiveness of IIA in such operations. Results of IIA will always differ with respect to the culture of the country involved as well as other operation situation considerations. In view of these, the IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operation as developed by this study can be applied not only in Nigeria, but other places with similar situation. This means that the outcome of this research has paved way for further study with respect to counterterrorism operations. Consequently, the author noted the following related areas for further study:

#### **How to Harmonize Direct and Indirect Approaches to Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria**

A study on how to harmonize direct and indirect approaches to counterterrorism operation in Nigeria is expected to reveal how the two approaches complement each other. It will also reveal the strengths and weaknesses that come with such operation and how success can be achieved by maintaining the requisite balance.

## The Role of the Military in Counterterrorism Operation in Nigeria

The role of the military in counterterrorism operation in Nigeria could be another area of further study. A study on that is expected to analyze in detail, the current roles of the military vis-à-vis the fight against BH. It will further research on how the military will adjust its strategy when indirect approach is fully incorporated in the counterterrorism operation in Nigeria.

### Relevance to Field of Study

It is necessary to emphasize that this research has contributed to the field of study with respect to counterterrorism operations. It has been able to identify the very need of IIA in counterterrorism operations in general and not just in Nigeria. Consequently, it is expected that the IIA Model for Counterterrorism Operations as developed by this study could be applied to any other place with similar situation as Nigeria.

**APPENDIX A**  
**CHRONICLES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN NIGERIA**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Acts of Terror</b>
1964-1966	Reign of political thuggery—killings, arson, kidnapping, and others.
1965-1966	Operation “Wet e” during the Western Region election crisis: massacre of Nigerians in the North.
1970	Armed robbery operations began.
1982-1983	Reign of political thuggery.
Mid 1980’s	Maitatsine religious uprising in Kano, Kaduna, Jimeta and others.
October 1986	Assassination of Dele Giwa. Editor of Newswatch. Through a letter bomb.*
October 1993	Hijacking of Nigerian Airways Airbus A310 to Niger by the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy.
June 19, 1994	Assassination of retired Vice Admiral B. Elegbede in Lagos.
August 15, 1994	Explosion of a device at the residence of then Transport Minister, Chief E. Babatope.
September 2, 1994	Explosion at Block A Flat 14. Legislators’ Quarters, Apo Abuja. Occupied by Mr. Oladimeji, delegate to the Constitutional Conference from Osogbo.
September 29, 1994	Explosion at NTA and FRCN building, Kaduna.
September 30, 1994	Explosion at Kaduna Refinery.
November 17, 1994	Explosion at the arrival wing of Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos.
Nov 22, 1994	Bomb scare at Radio House. Abuja
November 24, 1994	Explosion at the Command Children’s School. Abuja injures several children
May 31, 1995	Bomb blast at Shed 6 of Ilorin Stadium, Kwara state during the launching of the Kwara branch of the Family Support Program. The Head of the States’ wife was to be present but was absent at the occasion
October 6, 1995	Assassination of Chief A. Rewae at his home in Lagos.
January 18, 1996	Bomb blast at Durba Hotel, Kaduna.
January 19, 1990	Bomb blast at Mallam Aminu Kano International Airport, Kano.
February 3, 1996	Explosion near the Zonal Police HQ in Zaria affecting NITEL offices.

April 1996	Shooting of Sq Ldr Afowou at FESTAC, Lagos
April 13, 1996	Bomb blast at Ikeja Military Cantonment. Killing and wounding several people.
April 25, 1996	Bomb blast at the Nigerian Air Force Base, Ikeja.
May 23, 1996	Assassination of retired Rear Admiral E. Omotehinwa.
June 12, 1996	Assassination of Mrs. Kudirat Abiola in Lagos: Chief Ajagunna: Mr. Balogun
1999	Killing of 12 policemen and one soldier by Odi youths, leading to the sacking of the town by the military. Youths in the Niger Delta area hijack an oil company's helicopter conveying millions of naira. They share the money, but some are arrested.
2000	Sharia riots in Kaduna State. Leading to the death of over 2,000 people.
September 2001	Youths from Niger and Chad storm Jos, killing over 20 people and destroying several houses following the ethnic-religious conflict between Muslim Hausa-Fulani and Christian indigenes.
December 2001	Killing of 19 Nigerian soldiers by Tiv militia men leading to the sacking of Zaki Biam town in a military reprisal action: assassination of Hon. Odunayo Olagbaju of Osun State House of Assembly. Assassination of Chief Bola Ige. Federal Attorney General and Minister of Justice in his residence at Ibadan.
March 5, 2003	Assassination of Dr. Harry Marshall. A chieftain of the All Nigeria People's Party. Who decamped from the ruling People's Democratic Party where he was national Vice President.
February 6, 2004	Assassination of Chief A.K. Dikibo. National Vice-Chairman of the ruling PDP, South-South Zone.
March 3, 2004	Assassination of Hon. Luke Shigaba, former Caretaker Committee Chairman, Bassa Local Government, Kogi State.
March 4, 2004	Assassination of Chief A. Agom, former Managing Director, Nigerian Airways, member PDP Board of Trustees, while riding in a car with Governor George Akume.
March 4, 2004	Governor George Akume of Benue State narrowly escapes assassination while heading for a Northern governors meeting in Kaduna via Nassarawa State, where he was attacked.
March 8, 2004	Assassination of the Kogi State Independent electoral Commission Chairman, Chief P.E. Olorunipa at his residence.
October, 2004	Assassination of Mr. Agboola, an accountant with a Federal Unit at Ilorin, and of the aviation safety activist. Captain Jerry Agbeyegbe.

*Source:* Osioma Nwolise, "Terrorism: what is to be done about an emerging threat to democracy, good governance, development, and security of nations in the 21st century?," *Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique*, December 2005:, <http://books.openedition.org/ifra/800?lang=it> (accessed August 17, 2013).

**APPENDIX B**

**SOME RECENT ATTACKS ATTRIBUTED TO**

**BOKO HARAM TERRORIST GROUP**

September 21, 2010: In the Gwaidomari neighborhood—in Maiduguri, militants riding motorcycles fired upon and killed two people (a local chief and a trader) with Kalashnikov style rifles. A man claiming to be a chieftain of BH claimed responsibility on behalf of the group.

September 5, 2010: In the town of Bama, Borno, unidentified armed assailants on a motorcycle fired on and killed a retired police officer. A man claiming to be a chieftain of BH claimed responsibility. The group also claimed responsibility for another attack on the same day in Mauduguri, when unidentified gunmen riding a motorcycle fired upon the district head of Kalari area in Limanti Ward of Maiduguri, Lawan Zanna Mohammed Kagu, wounding Kagu and another person and killing a trader. And near the Maiduguri New Prisons, unidentified militants riding a motorcycle fired upon locals, injuring two people.

September 7, 2010: BH attacked a large prison in Bauchi; guards were overpowered and an estimated 800 prisoners were released, including at least 120 BH members or supporters who were awaiting trial.

October 6, 2010: In Maiduguri, unidentified militants riding motorcycles entered the house of wana Ali Ngala, the national vice chairman of the All Nigeria Peoples Party, and killed him in his living room. On the same day, unidentified militants riding motorcycles fired upon the house of Ali Modu, the speaker of the Borno state House of Assembly, killing one policeman.\*

October 9, 2010: In Maiduguri, two unidentified militants riding a motorcycle fired upon and killed Sheikh Bashir Mustapha, an Islamic scholar who was teaching in his home, and one other person.\*

October 19, 2010: In Maiduguri, three unidentified militants fired upon and killed Police Inspector Kashim Bukar as he walked home.\* Ganuwa, unidentified militants attacked and killed a local village head, Mohammed Tukur.\*

November 19, 2010: In Maiduguri, two unidentified militants riding motorcycles and armed with Kalashnikov style rifles fired upon and killed three people in front of the Gomari Jumat Wahabi mosque.\*

November 29, 2010: In Borno, a militant armed with a firearm, two swords, and a knife attempted to kill a village chief in the chief's compound.\*

December 24, 2010: In Jos, 38 people were killed and 74 others were injured when militants detonated four improvised explosive devices made with dynamite in the Kabong shopping market just minutes apart from one another. BH claimed responsibility for the attack. Meanwhile, a private security guard in Maiduguri was killed by militants in two vehicles when they fired on him with unknown firearms and threw an unknown number of petrol bombs at the Sinimari Church of Christ. The group also threw petrol bombs at the Dala Baptist Church, setting it on fire. Five people including a pastor were killed and 25 other people were injured when militants attacked the Victory Baptist Church with firearms and petrol bombs. BH claimed responsibility for these attacks as well.

December 24, 2010: Triple bomb blasts in the city of Jos killed over 80 people and wounded several dozen others, while over 100 people were killed in the reprisal

attacks in its aftermath. In a statement published on what is thought to be its website, <http://mansoorah.ne>, BH claimed responsibility.

December 28, 2010: In the Zinnari area of Maiduguri, unidentified militants fired on a teaching hospital and killed one policeman and two civilians.\*

December 31, 2010: In the neighborhood of Jikowyi in Abuja city, unidentified militants detonated an improvised explosive device at the Dunamis Church.\*

January 28, 2011: the Borno state candidate of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) for the April 2011 gubernatorial elections was assassinated, along with his brother, four police officers and a 12-year old boy. BH was blamed for the killings, though there is some debate about this—bombed by suspected members of BH.

April 15, 2011: Members of the sect bombed the Independent National Electoral Commission headquarters in Niger state.

April 20, 2011: BH killed a Muslim cleric and ambushed several police officers in Maiduguri.

April 22, 2011: BH freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa state.

May 29, 2011: On the day of President Goodluck Jonathan's inauguration, three bombs exploded within minutes of each other at an artillery brigades in Bauchi killing 13 people and injuring more than 40 others. Later that evening, another explosion occurred at a nearby drinking establishment in Shadawanka, killing six people.

May 30, 2011: Three men shot and killed Abba-Anas Umar Garbai, the younger brother of the Shehu of Borno, the most prominent traditional and Islamic spiritual leader in northeastern Nigeria. A spokesman for BH later claimed responsibility.

June 6, 2011: During a week of attacks on a church and police stations in Maiduguri, at least 14 people were killed in three explosions, including three people outside St Patrick's Catholic Church; David Usman, pastor of the Church of Christ in Nigeria, was shot dead by gunmen on motorcycles; and Ibrahim Birkuti, a Muslim cleric who had criticiszd BH, was shot dead outside his home in the town of Biu, roughly 120 miles south of Maiduguri.

June 7, 2011: In Maiduguri, gunmen attacked three police stations and the Ramat Square parade ground. Four explosions went off at Gwange police station, two at Dandal police station while the seventh bomb exploded near St. Patrick's (Catholic) church. A spokesman for BH also claimed responsibility, acknowledging that three of its members who attacked the Gwange police station were killed.

June 16, 2011: Four children were killed in a church playground in an explosion in the town of Damboa, south of the state capital Maiduguri, Borno state. \*

June 16, 2011: BH used a suicide car bomber to attack Nigeria's police headquarters (Louis Edet House) in Abuja. The explosion killed eight people, shattered the glass windows of the seven-story police headquarters and destroyed dozens of vehicles in the parking lot.

June 20, 2011: Five people were killed in an—attack on a community centre in Gomari, Maiduguri by BH members firing from the back of motorbikes.360 In a separate attack on the same day, suspected

BH gunmen killed a police officer in Maiduguri. BH may have also been responsible for other attacks against a bank and police station in Kankara town in Katsina state, though there are conflicting reports and nobody took credit for those attacks.

June 26, 2011: Men riding motorcycles threw bombs into outdoor beer gardens on Sunday night in the Dala area of Maiduguri, killing at least 25 people.

June 27, 2011: Two girls were killed and three customs officers wounded at the Custom House in Maiduguri. \*

July 3, 2011: An explosion killed at least 10 people and injured many others yesterday at a bar close to a police barracks in Maiduguri, Borno state. On the same day, gunmen shot dead Mustafa Baale, the chairman of Jere Local Government Area, after trailing him to his mother's house in Maiduguri.

July 4, 2011: Suspected members of BH killed a policeman and three staff of Shani local government area of Borno state and stole a significant amount of cash that was meant for paying the salaries of local government employees. Police subsequently raided an alleged hideout of suspected BH members, during which three people were killed.

July 5, 2011: After attacking the Toro Divisional Police Station (in Bauchi state) and chasing off the handful of police on duty, suspected members of BH ransacked the station's armory, carting away guns and ammunition.

July 6, 2011: BH members on a motorcycle threw a bomb at a military patrol vehicle, injuring three soldiers. On the same day, two policemen were trailed to their homes and killed; an Assistant Superintendent of Customs was killed at his house in Ummarari area of the state capital, Abuja; and three others were killed, including a customs officer.

July 10, 2011: A bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger state killed three people and wounded seven. Authorities also claimed that 11 members of

BH were killed and two soldiers wounded on Saturday night when the group attacked a military patrol in Maiduguri with explosives. And half a dozen people were wounded by an explosion near a popular hotel in the Obalende district of Kaduna.

July 22, 2011: An explosion at the Budun market—in Maiduguri, Borno state, injured three soldiers. \*

July 23, 2011: A bomb exploded in Maidugri, close to the home of Abubakar Ibn Umar Garbai El-kanemi, the Shehu of Borno, leaving three soldiers wounded. \*

July 26, 2011: BH members shot and killed Mohammed Ali Lawal, the district head of Bulabulin in Maiduguri, as well as his 9 year-old daughter.

August 2, 2011: A bomb exploded at Gomari Airport Ward in Maiduguri, killing at least one person. \*

August 4, 2011: An explosion in Maiduguri killed two people. \*

August 8, 2011: A 40-year-old school teacher, Nurudeen Algoni Umar was shot dead by suspected members of BH.

August 9, 2011: Members of BH attacked a police station on Baga Road in Maiduguri, injuring two people.

August 12, 2011: Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bana was shot dead by BH members while walking home from conducting prayers at the main mosque in Ngala.

August 15, 2011: A man was shot dead by Nigerian police on Monday in a failed attempt to bomb police headquarters in Maiduguri.

August 19, 2011: Members of BH shot dead three policemen and a civilian after breaking into the house of one of the officers in Maiduguri.

August 25, 2011: BH gunmen attacked two police stations and two banks in Gombe, in northern Nigeria, leaving 16 people dead.

August 26, 2011: At least 18 people were killed in a suicide car bombing at the U.N. building in Abuja. The driver entered the compound by ramming an exit gate, then maneuvered his vehicle into a parking garage before detonating it. This attack was BH's first attack against a transnational target rather than against a government or sectarian target .

September 4, 2011: Two BH gunmen shot dead an Islamic cleric Maiduguri.

September 12, 2011: Six policemen and a civilian—were killed by BH militants in Misau, Bauchi state following simultaneous attacks on a commercial bank and a police station in the area.

September 13, 2011: BH gunmen shot dead four people in a bar in Maiduguri.

October 1, 2011: Attackers used explosives and gunfire to target an army patrol near a wedding in Maiduguri, killing three civilians.

October 3, 2011: Suspected BH gunmen shot dead three people at a market in Maiduguri.

October 9, 2011: A roadside bomb in the Gwange area of Maiduguri was detonated as a military patrol vehicle was passing by, followed by shots fired by suspected BH militants.

October 12, 2011: Authorities say members of BH attacked a bank in Damboa, in northeast Nigeria, killing one police officer and stealing an undisclosed sum of money.

October 13, 2011: Suspected members of BH shot and killed a prison guard at his home in Maiduguri.

October 15, 2011: Gunmen Saturday killed Ali Banga, the leader of the Borno State Vigilante Association, after trailing him to his home in Maiduguri.<sup>384</sup> \*

October 16, 2011: Police suspect BH was responsible for the assassination of Modu Bintube, an MP in Borno state legislature, outside of his home in Maiduguri.

October 16, 2011: A bomb explosion killed three people at a police station in Gombe, northern Nigeria. Gombe Police Commissioner G.E. Orubebe said it was not clear who was behind the attack but it bore the hallmarks of similar strikes carried out by BH.

October 19, 2011: A Muslim cleric and his student were killed in Layin Tanki, in Gwange area of Maiduguri.

October 21, 2011: Alhaji Zakariya Isa, a reporter for Nigerian Television Authority, died after being shot in the head and chest at his home in Maiduguri. A day later, BH spokesman Abu Qaqa indicated that his group had carried out the attack.

October 27, 2011: A bomb was used to attack a military patrol in Maiduguri. \*

October 29, 2011: Suspected BH gunmen killed a cleric in Maiduguri identified as Goni Ali Gana'a.

October 30, 2011: A roadside bomb was used—in an attack against a military patrol in Maiduguri.

November 4, 2011: Several explosions took place throughout Maiduguri, including one at a military office. A soldier was also killed at the popular Monday Market in Maiduguri.

November 5, 2011: A series of coordinated attacks in Borno and Yobe states, primarily around Damaturu, killed at least 67 people, leaving a new police headquarters

in ruins, and government offices burned. A BH spokesman told *The Daily Trust* newspaper that it was responsible for the attacks and promised more.

November 9, 2011: Four policemen were killed in Mainok (northern Nigeria), and a police station and the rescue unit of the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) were destroyed by suspected members of BH. The group also stormed the residence of the Mainok village head; he was not home, but they killed his brother.

November 13, 2011: A roadside bomb exploded in Bauchi, injuring four people. On the same day, three gunmen killed a man near the home of the Shehu of Borno.\*

November 14, 2011: Three suspected Boko Haram gunmen attacked the residents of an Islamic scholar in Borno state and killed an 18-yearold Islamic student.

November 21, 2011: Members of BH attacked a Joint Task Force base in the Bulumkutu Market area of Maiduguri and engaged officers in a shootout lasting several hours. Meanwhile, in the Gwange area of Maiduguri, gunmen killed Kala Boro a protocol officer at the Borno state Government House.

December 4: BH gunmen attacked police area command headquarters in Bauchi state, killing six people and injuring five others.

December 25, 2011: At least 42 people are killed at several churches around Nigeria, including St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, a town near Abuja, as well as churches in Jos and Gadaka; the attacks are claimed by BH.

January 20, 2012: Bomb attacks and shootings in Kano, Nigeria's second largest city, killed 186 people in the group's most deadly attacks to date.– a police station in Kano, and issued a warning that if group members who had been captured in the north-western Sokoto state were not released, Kano style attack would be launched there.

February 16, 2012: Armed gunmen stormed a federal prison, killing a guard and freeing 119 inmates; BH later claimed 7 of those freed were members.

February 20, 2012: Suspected BH militants killed at least 30 men, women and children at the Baga market in Maiduguri.

February 26, 2012: Dozens were killed and injured in attacks on churches in Jos and Gombe states, and seven suspects were arrested while attempting to bomb a church in Bauchi.

February 26, 2012: Motorcycle-mounted gunmen killed three police officers at a checkpoint in Borno state.

February 27, 2012: BH members attacked a police station in Adamawa state.

February 28, 2012: Suspected BH militants set fire to the Gamboru Primary School in Maiduguri, and claimed responsibility for burning down another primary school in Maiduguri two days earlier.

\* Indicates attacks have taken place for which no group claimed responsibility, but authorities believe that BH may be linked to these as well.

*Source:* James Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” *Report of Joint Special Operation University* 12, no. 5 (May 2012), 135-142.

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